THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: 1921-1930
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The selection of William Howard Taft to succeed Edward D. White
as Chief Justice in 1921 was followed by three additional appointments in
the next two years: George Sutherland, Pierce Butler, and Edward T.
Sanford replaced William R. Day, Mahlon Pitney, and John H. Clarke.
The upshot was something of a reign of terror for state and federal

legislation.'
White himself had been no great supporter of progressive legislation,
and neither Day nor Pitney was in later terms a flaming liberal. The last
two, however, had frequently voted with Holmes, Brandeis, and Clarke
to sustain social legislation against due process attacks. Sutherland, But-

ler, and Sanford, like Taft, tended to cast their lot with Van Devanter,
McReynolds, and McKenna, who had been frequent dissenters in substantive due process cases before 1921; thus a vocal minority became a
solid majority within a two-year period. The replacement of McKenna
by Harlan F. Stone in 1925 merely increased the number of regular dis-

senters from two to three. 2
* Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Thanks to Mary Beth Gose for
managing the computer; to Nelson Lund, David Vandermeulen, Steve Rowland, and Richard Cray
Donaldson for useful seminar papers; and to Albert Alschuler, Frank Easterbrook, Richard Helmholz, Richard Posner, Carol Rose, Geoffrey Stone, Cass Sunstein, and William Van Alstyne for
helpful criticism.
1. See Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARv. L. REV.
943, 944 (1927) ("[I]n the six years since 1920 the Supreme Court has declared social and economic
legislation unconstitutional under the due process clauses of either the Fifth or the Fourteenth
Amendment in more cases than in the entire fifty-two previous years .... ").
2. JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF WILLIAM HowARD TAFT
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app. A (10th ed. 1980).
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During the Taft years, the Court not only wielded due process with
unprecedented ferocity to annihilate social measures but extended it to
new fields as well, forbidding the outlawing of foreign languages and of
4
private schools in Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.
5
The Court assumed in Gitlow v. New York and in Whitney v. California,6
and may have held in Fiske v. Kansas,7 that due process protected freedom of expression or assembly as well, but continued to construe those
freedoms narrowly over famous objections by Holmes and Brandeis. The
taking clause of the fifth amendment-which the Court had long held
applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment-was
given new content by none other than the normally restrained Holmes in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.8 And federal cases arising largely out
of Prohibition began to develop the contours of fourth amendment
search and seizure law.
In matters of federalism, the record of the Taft period is mixed. One
of the Chief Justice's first opinions departed strikingly from the direction
of earlier tax cases by invalidating a federal tax on goods made by child
labor, and in another decision the Court held that baseball was not interstate commerce under the Sherman Act. At the same time, however, the
Court not only gave a broad reading to congressional authority to enforce the prohibition amendment, but reaffirmed Holmes's conclusion
that stockyards were part of the current of commerce, and seemed to
recede from Hammer v. Dagenhart9 by permitting Congress to forbid
interstate transportation of stolen cars. Justice McReynolds's pet doctrine limiting the maritime application of state laws underwent an interesting modification, while Justice Stone contributed new insights into the
recurring problems of commercial and governmental immunities.
Biographies of Justices of this period include M. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES:
1841-1870 (1957); M. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE
PROVING YEARS, 1870-1882 (1963); A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE (1946) [hereinaf-

THE SHAPING YEARS,

ter cited as

A. MASON, BRANDEIS]; A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW

(1956) [hereinafter cited as A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE]; A. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD
TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE (1964) [hereinafter cited as A. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT]; M. MCDEVrT, JOSEPH MCKENNA, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES (1946); J. MCLEAN,
WILLIAM RUFUS DAY (1946); J. PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE
STATE (1951); H. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT (1939); H.
WARNER, THE LIFE OF MR. IUSTICE CLARKE (1959).
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8. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
9. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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With the possible exception of the due process revolution, the most
interesting product of the Taft years was a series of major decisions respecting the separation of federal powers. The case-or-controversy limitation that had been applied in Muskrat v. United States 10 was elaborated
in Tutun v. United States," Massachusetts v. Mellon, 12 Keller v. Potomac
Electric Co., 13 and a variety of decisions respecting ripeness and declaratory judgments. Judicial independence received a setback when Exparte
Bakelite Corp.14 concluded that the Court of Customs Appeals had been
established without regard to article III. The great case of Myers v.
United States 15 resolved an ancient controversy in upholding the President's authority to fire a subordinate despite a statutory requirement of
Senate consent. Springer v. PhilippineIslands,16 construing the act setting up a local government, implied important constitutional limitations
on legislative powers of appointment. J. W. Hampton Co. v. United
States 17 upheld yet another broad delegation of discretion to the President. The Pocket Veto Case' 8 gave a liberal interpretation to the President's power to avoid the overriding of a veto, and McGrain v.
Daugherty19 legitimatized the legislative investigation.
20
It was an exciting time. Let us get directly to the particulars.
I.

A.

LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND EQUALITY

Constrictingthe Social State.

1. EqualProtection. The equal protection clause had played little
part in controlling state action before 1921. Not only had the separatebut-equal doctrine-which the Taft Court unanimously reaffirmed-limited the reach of the clause even in the racial field, 21 but in other areas the
10. 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
11. 270 U.S. 568 (1926).

12. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
13. 261 U.S. 428 (1923).

14. 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
15. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
16. 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
17. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).

18. 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
19. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
20. This article is the continuation of a series that traces the Court's constitutional decisions

from its establishment in 1789. See D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION INTHE SUPREME COURT:
THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888 (1985); Currie, The Constitutionin the Supreme Court:
The ProtectionofEconomic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 324 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
Fuller I]; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Full Faith and the Bill of Rights, 18891910, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 867 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Fuller II]; Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: 1910-1921, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1111 [hereinafter cited as White].
21. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (Taft, C.J.) (upholding state authority to exclude
child of Chinese extraction from "white" school because "equal" facilities were provided for non-
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Court had made clear that equality required only that persons similarly
situated be treated alike. Reasonable classifications were permissible;
only when the Court could find no justification beyond what Cass Sun23
22
stein has called a "naked preference" would the clause be invoked.
The test, moreover, was a deferential one. An ordinance excluding loco-

motives from a single street, for example, was upheld on the ground that
other streets might have lesser problems, without any proof that they
had. 24 Given such an attitude, it was not surprising that the Court had
found very few unreasonable classifications.
Before he had been in office three months, however, Chief Justice

Taft, in Truax v. Corrigan,25 found another. Arizona had forbidden injunctions against picketing by striking workers. Similar conduct by a
competitor, the Court observed, could have been enjoined, and there was
26
no reasonable basis for the distinction.

Pitney, Holmes, Clarke, and Brandeis vainly protested that the em-

27
ployment relationship had often been singled out for special treatment.

Those cases had concerned work-related injuries, Taft retorted, without
saying why that was significant. 28 No matter; the question was whether
the Arizona injunction law was reasonable. The dissenters argued that in
the labor field problems had been encountered with the use of the injuncwhites); cf D. CURRIE, supranote 20, at 387-90 (discussing Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)),
and Fuller I, supra note 20, at 369-70 (discussing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
22. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984).
23. See, for example, Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205, 210 (1888) ("Mhe hazardous
character of the business of operating a railway would seem to call for special legislation. ....);
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885) (equality means equal treatment of those "similarly
situated"); and Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) ("The discrimination against aliens in the
wide range of employments to which the act relates is made an end in itself. . . ."). See generally
D. CURIE, supra note 20, at 383-92; Fuller1,supra note 20, at 369-86; White, supra note 20, at
1136-38.
24. Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. 521, 529 (1878) (adding that it was "the special duty of
the city authorities to make the necessary discriminations in this particular"); see also Fifth Ave.
Coach Co. v. City of New York, 221 U.S. 467, 484 (1911) (allowing city to prohibit advertising on
bus exteriors while permitting ads on stairs and structures of elevated railways, saying only "[this
difference, too, is within the power of classification which the city possesses"); Beers v. Glynn, 211
U.S. 477, 484-85 (1909) (upholding state inheritance tax on nonresident's local personalty only
when decedent also owned realty within the state); Florida Cent. & Peninsular R.R. v. Reynolds,
183 U.S. 471 (1902) (allowing state to collect delinquent taxes from railroads while failing to collect
from other taxpayers); see 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 294-300 (1984) (concluding that during the early White years the equal protection
clause had been almost explicitly abandoned).
25. 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (raft, C.J.).
26. Id at 331-39.
27. Id at 343 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); id at 352-53 (Pitney and Clarke, JJ., dissenting); id. at
355-56 (Brandeis, 3., dissenting).
28. Id at 338-39.
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tion;29 the majority ridiculed the suggestion by asking whether the fre-

quency of labor violence would justify exempting strikers from the law of
criminal assault.

30

That the Court was not looking very hard for justification seems
evident. The same critical attitude was reflected a few years later in
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania.31 After decades of indifference to
special corporate taxes, the Court in Quaker City Cab held, over the
usual dissents, that a state could not limit a taxicab receipts tax to cabs
32
operated by corporations.

Accustomed to a more deferential approach to economic classifica-

tions, the late twentieth-century reader may find these decisions quite
foreign. Yet there is a very modem ring about the Chief Justice's insistence in Truax that a classification affecting "fundamental rights" be subjected to "attentive judgment" and that an earlier decision upholding a

classification was distinguishable on the ground that it had dealt only
with "economic policy. '33 Later Justices would not agree with his characterization of the employer's business and property interests as fundamental, though it certainly fits the Lockeian model. 34 But a later
29. Id. at 342-43 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id at 352-53 (Pitney, J., dissenting); cf Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 370 (1927) (Sanford, J.):
A statute does not violate the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embrachg..
.. A State may properly direct its legislation against what it deems an existing evil
without covering the whole field of possible abuses. ...
The statute must be presumed to
be aimed at an evil where experience shows it to be most felt, and to be deemed by the
legislature coextensive with the practical need; and is not to be overthrown merely because
other instances may be suggested to which it also might have been applied; that being a
matter for the legislature to determine unless the case is very clear.
30. Truax, 257 U.S. at 339. The majority did not respond to Pitney's powerful argument that
the employer had no standing to invoke the constitutional rights of his competitors. See iL at 34950 (Pitney, J., dissenting).

31. 277 U.S. 389 (1928) (Butler, 3.).
32. Id. at 400-02. Dissents were entered by Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone. Id. at 40312. Cf Frost v. Corporation Conim'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929) (Sutherland, J.) (holding over same
dissents that cooperatives could not be exempted from public necessity requirement applicable to
other cotton gin operators). But see, e.g., Florida C. & P.R.R. v. Reynolds, 183 U.S. 471 (1902)
(upholding validity of state law that compelled collection of delinquent taxes from railway companies for certain years, but which contained no similar provision regarding other property owners);
Quaker City Cab, 277 U.S. at 411-12 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Even the Taft Court, soon after
Quaker City Cab, held it permissible to reassess a corporation's taxes without doing the same for
individuals. See White River Lumber Co. v. Arkansas ex rel Applegate, 279 U.S. 692, 696 (1929)
(Sanford, J.), which offered no reason for the discrimination and distinguished Quaker City Cab on
the insufficient ground that case had not involved back taxes. In White River, Butler, Van Devanter,
and Taft dissented. For another example of exacting equal protection scrutiny by the Taft Court, see
Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926) (McReynolds, J., over the usual dissents by Holmes,
Brandeis, and Stone) (state could not tax all gifts made within six years before death to prevent
evasion of succession taxes).
33. Truax, 257 U.S. at 335, 338.
34. See J. LOcKE, SEcoN) TREATISE OF Cwvit GovERNmENT 56-58 (L. DeKoster ed. 1978):
"The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves

70
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generation reached a conclusion strikingly similar to that of Truax in
holding that, in light of the fundamental interest in freedom of speech,

discrimination in favor of labor invalidated a ban on residential
35

picketing.
The Taft Court was not consistently vigorous in scrutinizing classifi-

cations. Laws forbidding aliens to own land, for example, were emphatically upheld on the basis of the state's concern for security, 36 although

the interest in owning property seems at least as "fundamental" as the
incident of ownership protected in Truax, and although a limitation on
alien employment had been struck down during the White years as supported by no legitimate purpose. 37 Indeed, when it came to something

less fundamental-the right to operate billiard parlors-the Court upheld a discrimination against aliens with barely a hint of speculation as to

why it might be reasonable. 3 At the other extreme, however, when
Texas excluded blacks from voting in primary elections, the Court
seemed unwilling to admit the possibility of any justification:
[The Fourteenth] Amendment, while it applies to all, was passed, as
we know, with a special intent to protect the blacks from discrimina-

tion against them.... States may do a good deal of classifying that it
under government is the preservation of their property. . ."-by which Locke meant "their lives,
liberties, and estates."
35. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). The remedial consequences of finding an equal protection violation, however, were quite different in the two cases: While Truax held only the labor
exception invalid and contemplated that the picketing would be enjoined on remand, Truax, 257
U.S. at 341-42, Carey held that the entire prohibition on picketing must fall because of the invalid
exception, Carey, 447 U.S. at 459 n.2.
36. Eg., Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923) (Butler, J.); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S.
197 (1923) (Butler, J.). In neither case was there dissent on the merits.
37. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (striking down ban on alien employment), noted
in White, supra note 20, at 1137 n.140. In fact, the White Court had drawn much the same distinction between alien ownership of land and alien employment, upholding an alien land law with little
effort at justification in Toop v. Ulysses Land Co., 237 U.S. 580 (1915). The laws upheld in Terrace
and in Porterfield, however, excluded only those aliens who had not declared their intention to
become citizens, or those who were ineligible for citizenship; the Court declined to find in these
distinctions a disguised discrimination against Japanese and Chinese, who were not eligible for citizenship. See Terrace, 263 U.S. at 220; see also Collins, Will the CaliforniaAlien Land Law Stand the
Test of the Fourteenth Amendment? 23 YALE L.J. 330 (1914) (arguing that statutory terms were
euphemisms for forbidden racial classifications); Powell, Alien Land Cases in United States Supreme
Court, 12 CAL. L. Rnv. 259, 270-74, 273 (1924) (arguing persuasively that justification given to
sustain discrimination against those not planning to become citizens showed irrationality of excluding only those who were ineligible: "Mr. Justice Butler's two opinions disclose no satisfactory reasons, since when taken together they destroy the only reason suggested. .... ).
38. Ohio ex rel Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (Stone, J.) (noting that the
ordinance "presupposes that aliens in Cincinnati are not as well qualified as citizens to engage in this
business" and adverting to "the view admitted by the pleadings that the associations, experiences
and interests of members of the class disqualified the class as a whole from conducting a business of
dangerous tendencies"). The contrast between this decision and Quaker City Cab suggests in later
terms that the Court thought corporations a more suspect classification than aliens.
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is difficult to believe rational, but there are limits, and it is too clear for
extended argument that color cannot be made the basis
of a statutory
39

classification affecting the right set up in this case.
The notion that more than one level of scrutiny might be available in

equal protection cases seemed to be well on its way.
2. The Duty to Protect Property. More interesting still was the
distinct and broader rationale that the majority in Truax v. Corriganembraced before it even began to discuss equal protection: Free access to
the employer's premises was a part of the employer's property right;
picketing interfered with that right; and a "law which operates to make
lawful such a wrong... deprives the owner of the business and the premises of his property without due process."'' 4

There were three difficulties with this cryptic reasoning. First, the
Court nowhere referred to Arizona law in determining the extent of the
property right in question. Nearly a century before, the Court had estab-

lished that article 1, section 10 forbade the states to impair only those
contractual obligations that were defined by state law. 4 1 The Berea College case seemed to have applied the same principle in defining "property" under the due process clause by holding that a corporation's

property rights were limited by its charter. 42 If the law applicable when
Truax acquired his property did not give him the right to be free of labor
43
pickets, the denial of a remedy did not deprive him of property.
39. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (Holmes, J.,for a unanimous Court). The
Court refrained from invoking the facially more obviously applicable fifteenth amendment, which
deals explicitly with racial discrimination in voting, presumably because of the narrow construction
given similar language respecting congressional authority over federal elections, see, eg., Newberry
v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 255-58 (1921) (congressional authority under U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 4
did not reach primary elections), discussed in White, supra note 20, at 1128 n.88. As an original
matter, the applicability of the fourteenth amendment's prohibitions to political matters such as
voting had been extremely doubtful not only in light of the alternative remedies for voting discrimination provided elsewhere in the same amendment, but because of the repeated assurances of the
sponsors. These arguments had been sidestepped rather than rejected in the jury discrimination
cases of the 1880's, which had focused on the defendant's interest in a fair trial. See D. CURRIE,
supra note 20, at 383-85 (discussing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)). Holmes did
not address the issue in Nixon.
40. Truax, 257 U.S. at 328.
41. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 20,
at 150-56.
42. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 56-58 (1908), discussedin FullerI, supranote 20,
at 369 n.273; see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) ("A property interest in employment
can, of course, be created by ordinance, or by an implied contract. In either case, however, the
sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided by reference to state law."); Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972); Demorest v. City Bank Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1944).
43. In fact, picketing had been enjoinable in Arizona until passage of the statute at issue in
Truax, 257 U.S. at 323, but the Court did not rely on that circumstance in explaining that there had
been a deprivation of property.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1986:65

Second, despite frequent statements that the only deprivations of liberty or property compatible with due process of law were those imposed

after a criminal trial,44 a long series of cases had established that both
liberty and property were themselves qualified by the police power. 45 In
contrast to earlier decisions, the Court made no effort in Truax to show
why the law immunizing picketing was not a reasonable police power
measure.

Finally, the conclusion that the state had deprived Truax of his
property by failing to provide him with judicial protection was of the
greatest interest and importance. 4 6 In the Federal Republic of Germany,
the Constitutional Court has held that a constitutional right to life requires that abortion generally be made a crime4 7-although there, as
here, the relevant constitutional provisions limit only official and not private action.4 8 Yet in the usual abortion case, as in Truax, it is not the
44. See, e.g., University of North Carolina v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 57, 63 (1804) (construing
law-of-the-land provision):
The property vested in the trustees must remain for the uses intended for the university,
until the judiciary of the country in the usual and common form pronounce them guilty of
such acts as will, in law, amount to a forfeiture of their rights or a dissolution of their body.
See also Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 692 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting) (liberty inviolable
"except in punishment for crime"); Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil
War, 24 HARV. L. REv.366, 381-84 (1911). The alternative argument that reasonable legislation
constituted the due process necessary to justify a deprivation would have explained, as the argument
under discussion did not, why taxation was sometimes permitted.
45. See, ag., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("Both property and liberty are held
on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the governing power of the State in the exercise
of. . .[police] powers."); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 (1898) (upholding maximum hour
legislation for miners because the "right of contract. . . is itself subject to certain limitations which
the State may lawfully impose in the exercise of its police powers"); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
145 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting) ("The doctrine that each one must so use his own as not to injure
his neighbor . . . is the rule by which every member of society must possess and enjoy his property."); T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONs 573 (1st ed. Boston 1868) (quoting Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53 (Mass. 1851): "[E]very holder of property...
holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be. . .injurious to the rights of the
community. All property in this Commonwealth is . . . held subject to those general regulations
which are necessary to the common good and general welfare.").
46. As the dissenters argued in Truax, 257 U.S. at 349, it was not even clear that the statute
forbade all remedies for labor picketing. In terms it forbade only an injunction, leaving open the
possibility of both damages and criminal prosecution. Taft grasped at the state court's probably
loose statement that the statute made picketing "lawful" and went on to question the adequacy of
the criminal law that was arguably applicable. Truax, 257 U.S. at 328-29. See Frankfurter &
Greene, CongressionalPowerover the Labor Injunction, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 385, 408 (1931) (arguing for the constitutionality of a law denying federal jurisdiction to enjoin labor activity, and distinguishing Truax on the ground that the Court had viewed the Arizona law as legalizing the conduct
itself by removing all sanctions).
47. 39 BVerfG 1, 65 (1975).
48. Id. at 42 (concluding that under the Basic Law [Grundgesetz], the State's comprehensive
duty to protect every human life not only "prohibits. . .direct governmental encroachments upon
the developing life, but also commands the State. . .to safeguard it from illegal encroachments by
others"). See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] arts. 1(3), 2(2) (W. Ger. 1949, amended 1956): "The following
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government but a private individual who has brought about the depriva-

tion. In this country, as Judge Posner wrote in denying that the due
process clause required the state to rescue an accident victim, the Constitution is generally understood to be "a charter of negative rather than
positive liberties"-a guarantee of protection from rather than by the
49
government.

The possible ramifications of Taft's contrary conclusion are considerable: The state deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property whenever it fails to protect those interests from invasion by private parties. 50

The Constitution requires that murder and theft be prohibited. Common
law tort remedies may be abolished only if adequate substitutes are provided. Governments must prevent private interference with freedom of

expression or religion.
Indeed, the German cases have carried this principle further: Freedom of telecommunications requires the government to assure public access to broadcasting facilities; freedom of education may require the state
to provide schooling.5 1 Though Taft would no doubt have been horrified, the logic is forceful: If the state infringes liberty by failing to protect

it against third parties, the state also does so by failing to remedy a deficiency of funds. The state deprives a woman of her freedom to have an
abortion if it does not assure that she can afford it and of her life if it
basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. . . . Everyone shall have the
right to life and to inviolability of his person." The German court's conclusion was facilitated by
article l's explicit provision that the government shall not only "respect," but also "protect," the
"dignity of man." While the court relied in part upon this provision, its primary emphasis was on
the right to life provision, which does not include the "protect" language.
49. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).
50. Compare the language of the German court quoted supra note 48.
51. See 12 BVerfG 205 (1961) (interpreting the provision of GRUNDGESETz [GG] art. 5(1) (W.
Ger.) that "[f]reedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films are
guaranteed"):
Article 5 GG demands . . . that this modern instrument of opinion formation not be
handed over either to the state or to any one social group. Broadcast stations must therefore be so organized that all interests worthy of consideration have an influence in their
governing council and can express themselves in the overall program ....
12 BVerfG at 262-63. See also 33 BVerfG 303 (1972) (interpreting the provision of GRUNDGESETZ
[GG] art. 12(1) (W. Ger.) that "[a]ll Germans shall have the right freely to choose their. . . place of
training"):
The constitutional protection of basic rights in the field of education is not limited to the
protective function against governmental intervention traditionally ascribed to the basic
rights. . . . [T]he free choice of the place of education aims, by its nature, at free access to
institutions; the right would be worthless without the actual ability to make use of it. Accordingly, the draft of a framework law respecting higher education proceeds from the
assumption that every German is entitled to carry out his chosen post-secondary study
program if he demonstrates the requisite qualifications. Recognition of this entitlement is
not at the discretion of the lawmakers.
33 BVerfG at 330-31 (emphasis omitted).
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allows her to starve. 52
In a series of decisions culminating in the Civil Rights Cases in 1883,
the Supreme Court had made clear that the fourteenth amendment and
3
various other constitutional limitations applied only to official action.1
The Taft Court reaffirmed this conclusion in Corriganv. Buckley,5 4 unanimously holding that judicial enforcement did not make the government
responsible for a privately imposed racial covenant. 5 Truax suggests
that the state could have been held responsible for the private acts in all
these cases simply by pointing out its failure to prevent them. This interpretation would reduce longstanding precedents thought to have established landmark limitations on constitutional rights to technical barriers
avoidable by clever pleading.

None of this seems to have occurred to Chief Justice Taft, who cited
nothing in support of his crucial conclusion that to deny a remedy for
picketing would deprive the owner of his property. The sweeping implications of his position indicate the importance of inquiring into possible
analogies to support him.
The question had arisen twenty years before in an obscure case in
which it had been argued that a law eliminating liability for harm done to
unlicensed dogs deprived the dog owner of his property without due process. In resting its rejection of this argument on the imaginative conclusion that there was no true property right in dogs, 5 6 the Court seemed to
assume a duty to protect other property from private harm.5 7 More im52. For rejection of this argument in the abortion context, see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 47475 (1977) (state may favor childbirth over abortion and may implement that decision through its
allocation of public funds), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) ("[A]lthough government
may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not
remove those not of its own creation."). A distinction might be based on the traditional conception
of government duty as one of protection against third parties, see J. LOCKE, supra note 34, at 56-58,
but hardly on the text of the Constitution.
53. Eg., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (Congress may not forbid private discrimination under fourteenth amendment). See generally D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 393 -402.
54. 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (Sanford, J.).
55. The Court later changed its mind on this specific issue, without questioning the requirement
of state action. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
56. Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 701 (1897) ("[P]roperty in dogs is of an
imperfect or qualified nature. . . ."), discussed in FullerI, supra note 20, at 382 n.344. The Court
based its conclusion largely on Louisiana law, Sentell, 166 U.S. at 706, and derived this result largely
from the argument that dogs, unlike farm animals, generally served only ornamental purposes, id. at
701. This hardly seems to distinguish them from jewelry, however, which one supposes qualifies as
"property" under the amendment. Cf Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A PreliminaryInquiry, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 466, 475, 478 n.70 (1983) (also disparaging dogs).
57. Some years later, when a related argument about the sanctity of common law rules was
made against workmen's compensation, the standard defense was not to deny the premise, but to
argue there had been a quid pro quo: What the employer gave up in freedom from strict liability he
gained by a limitation of damages. See, eg., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 205
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portant than this unstated implication was a long succession of contract
clause cases holding that a state impaired the obligation of private con-

tracts if it placed excessive limitations on judicial remedies for breach.58
The same reasoning supports a similar reading of the taking clause: To
deny all remedies for trespass would effectively transfer private property
to public use. For the essence of private property is the right to exclude
59
other individuals.

Herein may lie a limiting principle that can reconcile Truax with the

general notion that the Constitution does not require government to take
affirmative action. Property and contract are legal constructs that almost
by definition entail governmental protection from third parties. Life and

liberty are not. A ban on state deprivation of life makes sense if it means
only that the government itself shall not kill; a similar statement with

regard to contract or property is less convincing. Perhaps theft, but not
murder, must be made a crime.
To state the matter this way makes it look suspect. Moreover, there

are substantial arguments for a broader version of the Truax principle.
The theory of the social contract that underlies our Constitution entails a

surrender of the right of self-help in exchange for government protection. 60 This understanding is made explicit by the original meaning of
the equal protection clause: If the state protects whites against private
violence, it must protect blacks as well. 6 1 Chief Justice Marshall put the
point more broadly: "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, when(1917). However, the Supreme Court did not rest entirely with this narrow defense, as emphasized
by dissents complaining of the absence of a quid pro quo when the Court later upheld a law imposing
unlimited strict liability on the basis of the police power. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250
U.S. 400, 450 (1919) (McReynolds, J., dissenting). Moreover, from the employer's point of view, the
problem of state inaction was not in issue in the compensation cases. There was no doubt that the
state was responsible for any deprivation that took place, for instead of merely refusing the employer
a remedy, the state had imposed on him a duty to pay.
58. E.g., Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 317, 318 (1843), discussed in D. CURRIE,
supra note 20, at 211-13.
59. That this right might be preserved by allowing the owner to use force to protect his own
property suggests only, as the workmen's compensation cases illustrated, that the state may have a
broad range of choice among means to meet its protection obligation. For the right of self-help
would be no better than no property right at all unless the state continued to forbid the use of
countervailing force by trespassers.
60. See, e.g., J.LOCKE, supra note 34, at 58:
But though men when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty, and executive
power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society,. . . yet it remains the
intention of everyone the better to preserve himself, his liberty, and his property[,]. . . the
power of that society . . . is obliged to secure every one's property . ...
This passage seems to suggest that government has assumed the obligation of giving more protection
than the individual had ina state of nature, not that it can absolve itself of responsibility by restoring
the law of the jungle.
61. See generally D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 342-51, 369-86.
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ever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to

afford that protection." 62 Though Marshall did not invoke the Constitution in this passage, it would not be a huge step beyond his position to

argue that because of this understanding, the life, liberty, and property
protections of the due process clauses imply a right to governmental pro63
tection without regard to equality.

The problem of government inaction raised by Truax v. Corrigan is
profoundly troubling. We shall not get to the bottom of it here.64 But
the Court seemed unaware that the problem even existed.

3. Later Due Process Cases. When maximum hour legislation for
factory workers was approved in 1917 without so much as a citation to
Lochner v. New York, 65 the earlier decision seemed thoroughly discred-

ited. 66 When a minimum wage law for District of Columbia women succumbed to a due process assault in Adkins v. Children's Hospital6 7 in

1923, however, Lochner formed the cornerstone of Justice Sutherland's
opinion. 68 Maximum hour legislation, the Court said, had been upheld
62. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("[lIt is a settled and invariable
principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every
injury its proper redress.") (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *109).
63. Given such a reading, the equal protection clause as originally understood is redundant;
but, as Marshall demonstrated, so are the necessary-and-proper clause and the tenth amendment.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-09, 419-21 (1819), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 160-68. For suggestions of affirmative government duties in other interesting
contexts, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (holding that fourteenth amendment
incorporates sixth amendment command that "the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence" and requires state to provide counsel for indigent criminal
defendant); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (provision setting fines so high as to discourage
violating the law in order to obtain a judicial test of its validity worked a deprivation of propertypresumably of the underlying right to charge remunerative rates-without due process), discussed in
FullerI, supra note 20, at 384-86); and the series of public forum cases holding that the first and
fourteenth amendments required governments to permit use of certain public properties for speech
purposes, eg., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating bans on distribution of handbills
on streets and sidewalks). The first two examples seem readily distinguishable: In both, the government had taken affirmative action against the individual, either by prosecution or by regulation of
rates. Some of the public forum cases also involve prosecution after the fact, but only to enforce the
government's asserted right not to contribute its property for the promotion of individual speech.
64. This problem is further explored in Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53
U. CHI. L. Rav. - (1986) (forthcoming).
65. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
66. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); see White, supra note 20, at 1130-31.
67. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
68. Id. at 548-50 (quoting at length from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)); ef id. at
564 (Taft, C.J., dissenting) ("It is impossible for me to reconcile the Bunting Case and the Lochner
Case and I have always supposed that the Lochner Case was thus overruled sub silentio."). When the
minimum wage issue had come up during the White years, the Court had divided 4-4 after the death
of Justice Lamar, who apparently had cast the fifth vote for invalidity in conference. See Stettler v.
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only when necessary to preserve health. To the dissenting arguments of
Taft, Sanford, and Holmes that minimum wages likewise served to keep
women healthy and chaste, 69 Sutherland responded with the improbable
observation that "[lt cannot be shown that well paid women safeguard
their morals more carefully than those who are poorly paid,"70° adding
that "the inquiry in respect . . . of the income necessary to preserve
health and morals ... must be answered for each individual considered
by herself and not by a general formula prescribed by a statutory bureau. 17 1 Sutherland concluded that it was unfair in any event to place
the burden of ameliorating the worker's poverty on her employer. 72 The
ritually invoked presumption of constitutionality had become a hollow
73
shell.
A law forbidding nighttime employment of women in restaurants
O'Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917); 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 24, at 592-603 (discussing
Stettler v. O'Hara); White, supra note 20, at 1131 n.102.
69. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 566-67. Brandeis did not participate. McKenna, who had written
Bunting, voted silently with the majority. See A. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFr, supra note 2,
at 264, which describes Taft's dissenting vote in Adkins as an aberration from his conservative values, but attributable to his respect for precedent. Precedent was applicable only for those who believed minimum wage laws to be plausible health measures.
70. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 556.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 557-59. The economically apparent connection between poverty and prostitution
was a frequent theme in nineteenth-century literature. See, eg., F. DoSTOEVSKi, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (C. Garnett trans. 1938); T. FONTANE, IRRUNGEN, WIRRUNGEN (H. Fikentscher rev. ed.
1929); J. GOETHE, URFAUsT (C. Thomas trans. 1892); V. HUGO, LES MISERABLES (L. Wraxall
trans. 1887). The Chief Justice invoked more scientific studies, disclosed in the briefs and records,
that found a direct relation between low wages and poor health. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 564 (Taft, CJ.,
dissenting). See Brown, Police Power-Legislationfor Health and Personal Safety, 42 HARV. L.
REV. 866, 887, 898 (1929) ("it cannot be denied that starvation wages contribute to sickness and
immorality"; Adkins stands alone in rejecting a law supported by substantial health or safety considerations). For contrasting academic views at the time the issue first reached the Court, compare
Brown, Oregon Minimum Wage Cases, 1 MINN. L. REV. 471, 484 (1917) (invoking, among other
things, the familar economic argument that minimum wage laws were bad for workers because they
led to curtailment of jobs), with Powell, The ConstitutionalIssue in Minimum Wage Legislation, 2
MINN. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1917) (defending such laws on ground that, though some workers would
lose their jobs, greater number would gain financial security). For the barely civil comments of
Professor Powell after Adkins was decided, see Powell, The Judicialityof Minimum- Wage Legislation, 37 HARV. L. REv. 545, 569, 571 (1924) (arguing that employers should provide a "living wage"
because employees must be fed in order to work, and finding Adkins opinion "ignorant" or "emotionally obtuse" in overlooking analogous precedents).
73. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 544; see also J. PASCHAL, supra note 2, at 124 ("Basically, the
decision in the Adkins case was an attack on the very idea of government."); Bikl6, JudicialDetermination of Questions of FactAffecting the ConstitutionalityofLegislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6,
12-13, 27 (1924) (noting inconsistencies in methods by which the Court ascertained factual premises
on which it based its determinations of reasonableness of laws, and urging that, as in Bunting, the
Court decline to set aside law without record proof that it was unreasonable); Finkelstein, From
Munn v. Illinois to Tyson v. Banton: A Study in the JudicialProcess, 27 COLUM. L. REv. 769, 783
(1927) (concluding, in light of Truax Adkins, and other decisions, that the Court was exercising a
"judicial veto" whenever "the court does not think that the legislation ought to have been adopted").
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passed muster the following Term as a health measure. 74 In its next
breath, however, with only Brandeis and Holmes dissenting, the Court
extinguished a law regulating the size of bread loaves in order to combat
consumer fraud. 75 A year later, six Justices joined in nullifying a law
forbidding the use of shoddy in quilt manufacturing. 76 In three successive split decisions, Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, held that
neither the resale price of theater tickets, the rates charged by employment agencies, nor the price of gasoline could be regulated, because none
of the businesses in question was "affected with a public interest." 77 Fi74. Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (Sutherland, J.) (without dissent).
75. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (Butler, J.). See also id. at 517 (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting). The majority objected particularly to the fixing of a maximum
loaf size, conceding that a minimum might be permissible. Brandeis sensibly responded that the
"prohibition of excess weight is imposed in order to prevent a loaf of one standard size from being
increased so much that it can readily be sold for a loaf of a larger standard size." See id. at 513-17,
519.
76. Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402 (1926) (Butler, J.). The Court distinguished the
sharply contrasting decision in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888), discussedin D. CURRI ,
supra note 20, at 377-78, which had upheld the prohibition of oleomargarine despite evidence that
the product produced by the litigant was healthful, by noting that the Powell Court had assumed
that other oleo was dangerous; in contrast, the Weaver Court assumed that sterilization would remove the dangers of shoddy. Weaver, 270 U.S. at 414; see also Weaver, 270 U.S. at 415 (Holmes,
Brandeis, and Stone, JJ., dissenting) (finding it reasonable for the legislature to conclude that inspection and tagging were inadequate means of protecting the public against unsterilized materials).
77. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350,
355 (1928); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 430 (1927). Of the four dissenters in the
earliest case, Sanford bowed to precedent in the next, and Brandeis and Stone apparently in the last,
leaving only the obdurate Holmes. See Williams, 278 U.S. at 245; Ribnik, 277 U.S. at 359-75;
Tyson, 273 U.S. at 445-56. According to the majority in these cases, German Alliance Ins. Co. v.
Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914), which had upheld regulation of insurance rates, had gone to the verge
of constitutionality; the Court explained Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), which had upheld
rent control, on the basis of an emergency. See Tyson, 273 U.S. at 434-37; White, supra note 20, at
1129-31. It was not enough, the Court concluded, that a business was large or the public legitimately concerned; the business "must be such . . . as to justify the conclusion that it has been
devoted to a public use and its use thereby in effect granted to the public." Williams, 278 U.S. at
240. Protested Stone:
As I read th[e] decisions, such regulation is within a state's power whenever any combination of circumstances seriously curtails the regulative force of competition, so that buyers
or sellers are placed at such a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that a legislature
might reasonably anticipate serious consequences to the community as a whole.
Ribnik, 277 U.S. at 360 (Stone, J., dissenting). It may be that this criterion was not met in the
gasoline case, see Williams, 278 U.S. at 240 (Sutherland, J., denying the existence of a monopoly),
but Justice Stone did not explain his concurrence in the result. See also 3. PASCHAL, supra note 2, at
127-30 (noting that original formulation of public interest test had been ambiguous); Rottschaefer,
The Fieldof GovernmentalPrice Control, 35 YALE L.J. 438, 451-60 (1926) (arguing that price control of necessaries was reasonable regardless of competition); Hamilton, Affectation with PublicInterest, 39 YALE L.J 1089, 1103 (1930) (criticizing reliance on Lord Hale's "affected with a public
interest" test to determine the validity of price control, and concluding that decisions of 1920's were
"a far cry from the time of Lord Hale, when all trafficking in wares was public"); McAllister, Lord
Hale and BusinessAffected with a PublicInterest, 43 HARV. L. REV. 759, 786 (1930) (largely agreeing with Hamilton but suggesting that Brandeis and Stone had concurred in Williams because "Ten-
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nally, in 1928, over two dissents, the Court struck down a requirement
that drugstores be owned by licensed pharmacists: "[M]ere stock ownership in a corporation, owning and operating a drug store, can have no
real or substantial relation to the public health .... -78 In this climate, it
was perhaps surprising that residential zoning was upheld by analogy to
nuisance laws. 79 Substantive due process had grown teeth such as it had
never exhibited before. 0
nessee had not shown that the business [of selling gasoline] was particularly subject to abuse in the
matter of price").
78. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 113 (1928) (Sutherland, J.); see also id. at
114 (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting) ("Argument has not been supposed to be necessary in
order to show that the divorce between the power of control and knowledge is an evil.").
79. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (Sutherland, J.) (over unelaborated dissents by Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler, id. at 397). But see Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (Sutherland, J.) (unanimously striking down a particular zoning
boundary as unreasonable). For the suggestion that Sutherland had initially planned to vote against
the validity of the zoning law in Euclid, see A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supranote 2, at 252
(stressing Stone's role in persuading Sutherland to change his mind); J. PASCHAL, supra note 2, at
127 (adding that "[t]he opinion makes clear that Sutherland saw in the zoning act not the deprivation of property, but its enhancement"); id. at 9-20 (recounting Sutherland's affinity for the idea of
Spencer and Cooley that government's sole function was to prevent people from injuring others). It
may also be significant that zoning laws, unlike others considered in this section, dealt with external
harms whose private resolution, as in the nuisance case, would often have entailed high transaction
costs. See Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 15-18 (1960); Brown, supra note 72,
at 873 (finding nuisance cases easy because of traditional rule of sic utere tuo). Euclid was previewed
in Bettman, Constitutionalityof Zoning, 37 HARV. L. Rv. 834, 846-51 (1924), and applauded in
Ribble, The Due Process Clause as a Limitation on MunicipalDiscretion in Zoning Legislation, 16
VA. L. REv. 689, 699 (1930) (noting the Court's tendency to be more tolerant of land use regulations, with the striking exception of the racial segregation case of Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917), discussedin White, supra note 20, at 1134-38, than of other purported exercises of the police
power).
80. See also Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927) (McReynolds, J., over
dissents by Holmes, Brand'eis, and Stone) (striking down state law forbidding geographical price
discrimination); Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923) (Taft,
C.J.) (unanimously invalidating state law requiring arbitration of wage disputes in meat-packing
industry); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926) (Sutherland,
J.) (resoundingly reaffirming doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in holding that state could not
condition carrier's use of highways on agreement to serve public generally: "If the state may compel
the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a
surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United
States may thus be manipulated out of existence."); cf. Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529
(1922) (Taft, C.J.) (state may not revoke foreign corporation's license to do local business for exercising federal right to remove case to federal court). For an excellent and approving summary of the
development of the unconstitutional conditions principle, see G. HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 110-11, 134-47 (1918).
Procedural due process decisions of the Taft era include Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276
(1922) (Brandeis, J.), which held that a person who had been ordered deported after an administrative hearing was entitled to a judicial redetermination of his claim to citizenship: "To deport one
who so claims to be a citizen, obviously deprives him of liberty. . . . The difference in security of
judicial over administrative action has been adverted to by this court." This was a significant step
beyond Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920), discussedin White, supra
note 20, at 1138 n.140, which had found a right to a de novo judicial determination of the question
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Civil Liberties.

1. Meyer v. Nebraska. Before the Taft period, the Supreme
Court had wielded substantive due process only to protect economic interests such as property and the notorious liberty of contract. The
Court's definition of the liberty protected by the due process clauses,
however, had always been broader. A vaccination law, for example, had
been upheld during the Fuller days only on the ground that it was a
reasonable health measure.8 1 In two important decisions in the Taft
years, the Court took further steps to entrench the amendment's protection of noneconomic liberties.
The first was Meyer v. Nebraska,8 2 decided in 1923, which set aside a
conviction for teaching German to a child who had not completed the
eighth grade. Earlier broad definitions of fourteenth-amendment "liberty" were elaborated:
[l]t denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
83
free men.

whether a quasi-legislative utility rate was confiscatory. Deportation of those not claiming to be
citizens, which would seem to involve a similar loss of liberty, was distinguished on the nonobvious
ground that citizenship was a "jurisdictional fact"; cases holding that a claim of citizenship did not
give a person excluded at the border a right to judicial hearing were distinguished without reasons.
See Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 282, 284; see also Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927)
(Butler, J.) (indulging the fiction that by using the highways a nonresident motorist appointed a local

agent to receive process in auto accident suits, but adding in more modem terms that "[i]n the public
interest the State may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the
part of all. . . who use its highways"); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (Taft, C.J.) (holding that judge may not be compensated according to fines imposed); A.B. Small Co. v. American
Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1925) (Van Devanter, J.) (extending void-for-vagueness doctrine to case involving civil sanctions); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923) (Holmes, J.)
(expanding the availability of habeas corpus in reaching the unsurprising conclusion that a criminal
trial dominated by a mob did not provide due process). See Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. Cr. REv. 85, 105 (describing Moore as novel because "reasoned wholly as a matter
of natural law" and Tumey, while based on history, as "the first case to declare a state law unconstitutional for want of adequate procedures (other than ex parte procedures)").
81. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 35 (1905), noted in Fuller I, supra note 20, at 379
n.326; see also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (dictum):
The liberty mentioned in [the fourteenth] amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the
term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that
purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his
carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
82. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (McReynolds, J.).
83. Id. at 399.
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The right to teach a foreign language, and the right to engage a language
instructor, fell within this definition; and "[m]ere knowledge of the Ger'84
man language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful.
Strictly speaking, the inclusion of the right to educate one's children
may have been dictum, since ordinarily the accused teacher would lack
standing to argue that the parents' rights had been infringed; and the
teacher's own right to teach was an economic liberty of the type that had
long been protected.8 5 Nevertheless, the Court stressed the parents' right
as if it were a part of the holding.8 6 This application of the term "liberty" seems neither more nor less justifiable than the original inclusion of
"liberty of contract." Once torn from its historical moorings, 87 "liberty"
may as well embrace freedom of any kind.
Not even Holmes took issue with that conclusion. His objection,
which Sutherland of all people joined, was that requiring a youngster to
hear only English at school was a reasonable means of achieving the legitimate end of assuring "that all the citizens of the United States should
speak a common tongue" despite their varied origins. 88 Admitting the
hardly disputable legitimacy of the end, the majority found the means
too extreme-less intrusive measures could have achieved the goal at a
lower cost to liberty.8 9
Meyer strikes a responsive chord today. Substantive due process
was there for the first time drawn upon to protect an intellectual freedom
dear to the modem observer against a ham-handed measure most would
now find seriously misguided. Justice Brandeis, a staunch holdout
against most economic applications of the doctrine, went along without a
murmur. But Holmes was entirely consistent in deferring to a legislative
judgment that was rational, though benighted; the price of deference to
legislative determinations is that bad laws must sometimes be upheld. 90
84. Id. at 400.
85. On the standing point, see, for example, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 73, 81 (1917),
where the Court carefully noted that the plaintiff was asserting only his own property rights. See
also White, supra note 20, at 1134-38 (discussing Buchanan). For the conclusion that Meyer in-

volved traditional economic rights, see Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the FourteenthAmendment, 39 HARV. L. REv. 431, 454 (1926).
86. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02 (stressing that ideas favoring state control over upbringing of
children are "wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest").
87. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 581, 590-92 (1897) (holding that due process clause
embraces liberty of contract), discussedin FullerI,supra note 20, at 375-78; see also Shattuck, The
True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federaland State Constitutions Which
Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property," 4 HARV. L. REv. 365, 372-73 (1891) ("liberty" in Magna

Charta referred only to freedom from imprisonment).
88. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 412-13.
89. Id. at 401-02.
90. Deference alone, however, does not seem to account for the evident relish with which
Holmes wrote, over the lone and unexplained dissent of Butler, to sustain a law providing for the
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The doctrinal basis for Meyer is as shaky as that of Lochner itself, for it is
the very same.
2. Gitlow v. New York. Not even Holmes dissented, however,
when the Meyer principle was applied two years later to forbid the effective outlawing of private schools in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.9 1 Moreover, Holmes and Brandeis were far less deferential to legislative
judgment than their brethren one week later when they dissented from
the upholding of a conviction for the publication of a revolutionary
92
screed in the famous case of Gitlow v. New York.
On the threshold question whether the fourteenth amendment made
the principles of freedom of expression applicable to the states, Holmes
was brief: "The general principle of free speech ...must be taken to be
included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has
been given to the word 'liberty' as there used ....-93 Brandeis expanded
on this theme in his celebrated concurring opinion two years later in
94
Whitney v. California:
Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive,
it is settled that the due process clause ...applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental
rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal
Constitution from invasion by the States. The right of free speech, the
right to95 teach, and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental
rights.
In other words, if you can't lick 'em, join 'em; if your pet rights are
protected by the shaky notion of substantive due process, so are mine.
Fair enough. But this all goes to show that-apart from the consistently
rejected theory that the fourteenth amendment incorporates the entire
Bill of Rights-the doctrinal basis for holding that the states are without
96
power to abridge expression is essentially that of Lochner v. New York.
involuntary sterilization of the feeble-minded: "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent

those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. .

.

. Three generations of imbeciles are

enough." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).

91. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (McReynolds, 3.). As in Meyer, although the Court stated flatly that
the law "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children," no parent was complaining; and the Court speciflcally added that the

law also infringed the schools' right to make profitable use of their property. See id. at 534-35
(citing Meyer); Warren, supra note 85, at 455.
92. 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
93. Id. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
94. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
95. Id. at 373.
96. For the incorporation theory, see the following examples: Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 71-75 (1947) (Black, I., dissenting); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 122 (1908) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 370 (1892) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). See generally D.
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As in earlier cases, the Court in Gitlow assumed, without deciding,
that freedom of speech fell within the "liberty" protected against state
invasion by the due process clause and treated the case as if it had involved a federal prosecution. 97 Earlier decisions, Justice Sanford rightly
observed, had established that this freedom was not absolute.98 It "does
not deprive a State of the primary and essential right of self preservation." 9 9 Sanford further noted that "utterances inciting to the overthrow
of organized government by unlawful means, present a sufficent danger
of substantive evil to bring their punishment within the range of legislative discretion." 100 And that was what the statute in Gitlow forbade: By
punishing one who "advocates . . . the duty, necessity or propriety of
overthrowing . . . organized government by force or violence,"' 01 the
state had penalized only "the advocacy of action," not "the utterance or
publication of abstract 'doctrine' or academic discussion having no quality of incitement to any concrete action."'' 0 2
The resemblance between these passages and Learned Hand's faCURRIE, supra note 20, at 345-47. Cf Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884) (due
process included only those common law procedures that were fundamental), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 366-68. One may argue that freedom of expression is a more fundamental
"liberty" than freedom of contract, but the basic difficulties of establishing that the due process
clauses impose substantive limitations on legislative authority to limit rights other than life, property, and freedom from imprisonment remain. Meyer v. Nebraska had presaged the inclusion of first
amendment liberties in the due process clause despite the potential argument that this made the first
and fifth amendments redundant: The Court there listed freedom of religion as among the liberties
protected against abridgement without due process. See supra text accompanying note 83.
97. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666. For a similar, but earlier, assumption, see Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). Just a few years before Gitlow, with no objection from Holmes or Brandeis, the Court flatly stated that "the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States no
obligation to confer upon those within their jurisdiction either the right of free speech or the right of
silence." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 538 (1922) (Pitney, J.) (holding due process not
offended by state law requiring employer to explain why employee left job). For the peculiar conclusion that by assuming that speech was among the liberties protected by the due process clause, the
Court in Gitlow decided that it was, see Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 322
(1941) (the Court was "persuaded. . . to settle the long-vexed issue at last by the unanimous statement that 'we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press . . . are among the
fundamental personal rights and liberties protected. . . from impairment by the states' "); Warren,
supra note 85, at 458 (Gitlow adopted as law the theory that the due process clause protected
noneconomic liberties other than freedom from physical restraint).
98. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666-67. In support of this assertion, the Court cited, among others,
Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 272, 277-78 (1915) (upholding punishment for expression interpreted
to encourage indecent exposure); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907) (upholding punishment for expression interfering with judicial proceeding); and several of the World War I cases,
including Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919) (upholding punishment for encouraging draft resistance). For a discussion of these antecedents, see White, supra note 20, at 1145-51.
99. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 668.
100. Id. at 669.
101. Id. at 654 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 161 (Consol. 1909)).
102. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 664-65.
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mous formulation in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten 10 3 is striking. By
insisting on actual incitement, both Hand and Sanford, in contrast to

Schenck's formulation of the clear and present danger test, had made
clear that the mere probability of harm would not suffice to make speech
punishable.: ° Yet posterity, while generally applauding Masses, has

dealt harshly with Gitlow. There seem to be at least two explanations for
this discrepancy.
First, despite its advantages, the incitement test alone, as Gitlow
demonstrates, is not sufficient to satisfy anyone who believes that en-

croachments upon the interest in free expression may be justified only
when the countervailing concern is overwhelming. Whether or not the
Court was right in concluding that the publication in question employed

"the language of direct incitement," 10 5 Holmes was surely right that
"there was no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government
by force on the part of the admittedly small minority who shared the
defendant's views." ' 10 6 Indeed, as he added, there was ample room for
"doubt whether there was any danger that the publication could produce

any result" at all.10 7 Having dismissed the Masses prosecution for failure
to establish incitement, Judge Hand had not had to deal with this

problem.
Whatever its weaknesses, the test Holmes had enunciated for the
Court in Schenck v. United States 0 8 had required that the danger be
103. 244 F. 535, 540-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917):
If one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the
law, it seems to me one should not be held to have attempted to cause its violation ...
The question. . . is. . .: Could any reasonable man say, not that the indirect result of
the language might be to arouse a seditious disposition, for that would not be enough, but
that the language directly advocated resistance to the draft?
See White, supra note 20, at 1149-51.
104. Holmes had taken significant steps in this direction by emphasizing in his later Abrams
dissent that the constitutional standard was especially strict in the absence of an intention to cause
harm, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Hand's test of
incitement, however, seemed more protective in this respect because of its emphasis on the objective
meaning of the words used. See Masses, 244 F. at 541-42. For discussion of passages in Gitlow that
suggest the less protective "natural tendency" test, see Z. CHAFEE, supra note 97, at 323-24.
105. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 665. As quoted in Gitlow, id. at 656-60 n.2, the publication said that
"[r]evolutionary socialism . . . insists . . . that it is necessary to destroy the parliamentary state"
and establish "a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. . . by means of revolutionary mass
action" building upon "mass industrial revolts," and ended with the declaration that "[t]he Communist International calls the proletariat of the world to the final strugglel"
106. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673.
107. I d; see also Z. CHAFEE, supra note 97, at 324: "The terror which these dull and rusty
phrases caused our prosecutors and judges would render them the laughing-stock of European
conservatives."
108. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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both "clear" and "present,"' 0 9 and Gitlow could not fairly be said to meet
either criterion. Justice Brandeis expanded on the basis for the immediacy requirement in Whitney: "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."'110 A later Court would combine the more protective features of
both the Holmes and Hand tests by requiring incitement to immediate
harm.' 11 In Gitlow, the majority approved the refusal of an instruction to
this effect and denied that the state was "required to defer the adoption
of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and
' 12
immediate danger of its own destruction."
The second important difference between Masses and Gitlow was the
explicit holding in the latter case that the statute should be judged only
on its face:
[W]hen the legislative body has determined generally... that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they
may be punished, the question whether any specific utterance coming
within the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the
substantive evil, is not open to consideration. 113
This issue had not been reached in Masses either, because Hand had
114
there held the statute had not been violated.

Holmes protested that Sanford's holding contradicted the rule of
Schenck that "the words used" in the particular case must create a clear
and present danger." 5 Sanford cleverly responded that there was more
reason to defer to legislative judgment when, as in Gitlow, the lawmakers
had focused directly upon the speech issue by enacting a statute specifi109. Id. at 52. In his dissent in Abrams v. United States, Holmes had sharpened the idea by
insisting that the danger be immediate in cases to which the test applied, Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See White, supra note 20, at 1152-55. Holmes was not inconsistent
in voting to convict Schenck but not Gitlow, for the two cases raised distinct problems. Schenck
showed that Holmes was willing to infer an intention to provoke crime though it had not been
clearly expressed. Gitlow showed that he took seriously the separate requirement that the risk be an
imminent one.
110. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,concurring).
11. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[T]he constitutional guarantees of
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.") (footnote omitted).
112. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 661, 669. In his dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627
(Holmes, J., dissenting), Holmes had said it would also suffice if the speaker had intended to create a
present danger. In Gitlow, he insisted that the indictment concerned only the publication and not its
author's intent to induce an uprising. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
113. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 670.
114. Masses, 244 F. at 542.
115. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52).
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cally limiting expression than when, as in Schenck, a statute forbidding
the causing of a crime in general terms was interpreted to include
speech. 116
In due process cases, moreover, the need for generality in enacting
rules had often persuaded the Court that a law did not have to be tailored
precisely to the facts. In Powell v. Pennsylvania,1 17 for example, the
Court had held the need to protect the public from unwholesome oleomargarine justified the legislature in banning even that oleomargarine
which was healthful.11 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 119
without an objection from Holmes or Brandeis, the Court upheld the
exclusion of all industry from residential neighborhoods because many
industries were offensive:
[T]his is no more than happens in respect of many practice-forbidding
laws which this Court has upheld although drawn in general terrs so
as to include individual cases that may turn out to be innocuous in
themselves. The inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effective
enforcement, will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of
120
invalidity.
If it is permissible to draft a statute broadly enough to embrace inoffensive conduct, then by definition the application of the statute to such
conduct is not unconstitutional.
This is not to say, however, that the legislature's decision to extend a
prohibition to inoffensive cases was immune to judicial investigation.
Deference to the legislature, as Justice Brandeis observed in Whitney v.
California, had never forbidden inquiry into the reasonableness of a
law. 121 On the contrary, the question whether the statute had been
drawn too broadly was part of the general inquiry into the reasonableness
of the fit between legislative ends and means, even when, as in Gitlow, the
legislature had explicitly addressed the question whether the interest asserted should be restricted. Not infrequently, indeed, the legislative judgment was found wanting. This was the basis, for example, of the decision
the year after Gitlow, that the state could not forbid all use of shoddy in
bedding simply because unsterilized shoddy posed a danger of
116. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 670-71. This argument seems also to distinguish such precedents as
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921) (striking down application of state
regulatory statute to interstate transactions), invoked by Brandeis in Whitney, 274 U.S. at 378, and
Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (I1 Wall.) 113 (1871) (federal income tax law could not constitutionally be

applied to salaries of state government officials). Neither in Dahnke- Walker nor in Day had the
legislature directed its attention toward interstate commerce or state officials, respectively.
117. 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
118. Id. at 684, discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 377-78.
119. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
120. Id at 388-89 (citations omitted).
121. 274 U.S. at 374, 378-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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infection.122
The basic question in Gitlow, then, was whether the legislative judgment to forbid all incitement to violent overthrow of the government was
reasonable, or whether the statute should have been limited to those incitements that created a clear and present danger of harm. For the majority, Justice Sanford did explain why he thought it was permissible not
to limit the statute to immediate threats: "If the State were compelled to
wait until the apprehended danger became certain, then its right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with the overthrow of
the government, when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor
courts for the enforcement of the law."' 23 He did not say, though, why it
was reasonable to prohibit publications as puny as Gitlow's. On the
other hand, apart from reliance on a passage from Schenck that had admittedly been qualified by later cases, Holmes offered no reason for his
contrary position that harmless incitements could not be included.
In retrospect, the majority appears to have been, as in the oleomargarine case, very deferential indeed. It is not at all clear why the state
thought it necessary to punish incitements posing no substantial danger.
The intimidating difficulties of enforcing a more selective measure that
had led to the flat ban invalidated in the shoddy case, for example,
seemed wholly absent in Gitlow. Maybe the Court, unlike Holmes,
thought that speech such as Gitlow's was of such low value that it did
not take much to make its inclusion in the prohibition reasonable.
Holmes and Brandeis, on the other hand, seemed far less deferential
to the legislative judgment in Gitlow than was their wont. Ever since his
celebrated dissent in Lochner, deference had been the hallmark of
Holmes's due process jurisprudence. Not only would both he and Brandeis emphatically dissent from invalidation of the shoddy law, where the
legislative judgment was arguably more reasonable than that in Gitlow,
they would repeatedly protest that the majority in the later case was substituting its judgment for that of the lawmakers. 24 In Gitlow, by contrast, they found the majority too deferential.
It was consistent enough for Holmes and Brandeis to take a less
deferential line when congressional restrictions of expression were concerned. Their deference in due process matters was a natural result of
their substantive position that the clause outlawed only unreasonable leg122. Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402, 415 (1926), discussedsupra text accompanying note

76.
123. Gidow, 268 U.S. at 669-70 (quoting People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 35, 136 N.E. 505, 512
(1922)).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 40-80.
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islation; 125 even if Congress was not ousted from the speech field altogether, the first amendment on its face imposed more stringent
limitations. 126 Their hard-line scrutiny in Gitlow, however, cannot be so
easily explained, for in their view Gitlow was a due process case-only
the due process clause limited state authority over expression.
Holmes displayed awareness of this distinction by acknowledging

generally that the states might enjoy "a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws of the United States." 127 Further, he

couched his conclusion that Gitlow could not be convicted in terms that
nominally satisfied his usual deferential standard: "[I]t is manifest that
there was no present danger ....,,128 Whether this conclusion really
jibed with Holmes's position that a state could reasonably find a ban on

foreign-language teaching necessary to assure fluency in English, however, may fairly be doubted. 129 Without spelling out arguments to support such a distinction, Holmes and Brandeis seemed to be moving
toward a stricter level of scrutiny in some substantive due process cases

than in others. The majority, in contrast, seemed to think speech cases
entailed, if anything, more deference than usual .

30

3. Whitney and Fiske. Whitney v. California131 was an even
weaker case for conviction than Gitlow. Ms. Whitney had been convicted
not for making a statement, but for helping to establish an organization

that espoused it. 132 "The novelty," as Brandeis observed in his separate
125. The same can be said of their deferential position in equal protection cases in light of the
accepted learning that the clause forbade only unreasonable classifications. E.g., Quaker City Cab
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 403, 405 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting, Brandeis, J.,
dissenting),
discussedsupra text accompanying note 32; F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 418
(1920) (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting).
126. Professor Thayer's famous argument for deference, however, like the suggestions in early
decisions that the Court should never set aside a legislative judgment except in a clear case, see D.
CURRIE, supra note 20, at 33, was based on institutional considerations that transcended the requirements of particular provisions. See J.THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 9-31 (1908). "It is plain that where
a power so momentous as this primary authority to interpret is given [to the legislature], the actual
determinations of the body to whom it is intrusted are entitled to a corresponding respect. . ....
Id. at 11.
127. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672. Without this qualification, the protection of speech against state
action would have the paradoxically illiberal result of strengthening Holmes's Schenck argument
that the protection of speech against acts of Congress was not absolute: Maybe Congress was not
meant to have power over people who shout "fire" in crowded theaters, but surely someone was.
128. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J.,dissenting).
129. Cf Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (Holmes, L, dissenting), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 81-91.
130. For later development of the notion of varying levels of scrutiny see, for example, United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
131. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
132. Id. at 360.
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opinion, "is that the statute aims, not at the practice of criminal syndicalism, nor even directly at the preaching of it, but at association with those

who propose to preach

'

it. 133

For the majority, Justice Sanford was un-

fazed: "That such united and joint action involves even greater danger to
the public peace and security than the isolated utterances and acts of
1 34
individuals, is clear."
As in Gitlow, the Court said it could not examine the defendant's
actual behavior, deferring this time not explicitly to a legislative judg-

ment but to the judicial factfinder: Though couched in constitutional
terms, the question whether the defendant had the requisite knowledge of
the association's purposes "is one of fact merely which is not open to

review in this Court, involving as it does no constitutional question
whatever."1

35

Like the question of review of a statute as applied, the problem of
deference to the factfinder in constitutional cases is a knotty one. On the
one hand, the Court had already held that it could not examine de novo a
state court determination that the compensation awarded for a taking
had been adequate. 36 On the other, the Court had also established that,
in order to prevent evasion of due process limitations on state tax power,
it was not bound by a state court's finding that the taxes in question had
been paid voluntarily. 137 In concluding not only that the jury's resolution of the question had been reasonable, but that the issue presented "no
133. Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring). See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 97, at 344-45 for a description of the innocence of Whitney's own activities and for the conclusion that she had been
convicted for "being at a meeting and nothing more." Both Gitlow and Whitney were pardoned
after the Court had upheld their convictions. See id. at 324, 352-53.
134. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372.
135. Id. at 367. In Gitlow the question was whether the statements created a constitutionally
sufficient danger; the further question in Whitney was whether there was a constitutionally sufficient
intent. As in Gitlow, the Court proceeded on the assumption that the fourteenth amendment made
first amendment guarantees applicable to the states, this time without adverting to the question.
136. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 242-46 (1897). At least to the extent
that "facts" in the historical sense are concerned, this degree of deference may be compelled in civil
jury cases by the seventh amendment: "[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONsT.
amend. VII.
137. Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1920) ("Of course, if non-federal grounds, plainly
untenable, may be thus put forward successfully, our power to review easily may be avoided."). It is
useful to compare Ward to the numerous cases reexamining, for the same reason, a state court
finding that a contract allegedly impaired had never existed. See, e.g., Piqua Branch of State Bank v.
Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 382 (1854), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 218-19. In
later years, indeed, the Court would insist on reviewing de novo such questions as whether a confession was coerced, a search unreasonable, or a defamatory statement malicious. See, e.g., Monaghan,
ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229 (1985) (discussing Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485 (1984), and its constitutional requirement that appellate judges
review record to determine whether actual malice was shown in defamation cases).
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constitutional question whatever," 138 the Court was not necessarily contradicting the latter decision; it may have meant, along the lines suggested in Gitlow, that a statute including unsuspecting members of a
prohibitable association would be constitutional. Unfortunately, if this is
what Sanford had in mind, he neither said so nor defended that rather
extreme conclusion.
Joined by Holmes, Brandeis eloquently enlarged upon the former's
explanation of the purposes of the first amendment, reaffirmed that the
danger of harm must be both immediate and serious, and rejected Sanford's "suggestion ...that assembling with a political party, formed to
advocate the desirability of a proletarian revolution by mass action at
some date necessarily far in the future, is not a right within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 139 Nevertheless, Brandeis and
Holmes did not dissent; finding "other testimony" supporting "the existence of a conspiracy ...to commit present serious crimes" that "would
be furthered by the activity of the society of which Miss Whitney was a
member," they concurred on the ground of her failure to preserve the
clear and present danger issue in the lower courts.140
What was most remarkable was what Justice Sanford wrote on the
same day for an undivided Court in Fiske v. Kansas.141 The statute in
issue was much the same as those upheld in Gitlow and Whitney, and in
both those cases the Court had refused to review the facts. In Fiske,
Sanford both said and did the opposite. "[TJhis Court will review the
finding of facts by a State court where a federal right has been denied as
the result of a finding shown by the record to be without evidence to
support it...."
142 Though the pamphlets the defendant had distributed
indeed sought sweeping social changes, in contrast to Gitlow or Whitney,
there was neither "charge [n]or evidence that the organization in which
he secured members advocated any crime, violence or other unlawful
acts as a means of effecting" them. 143
Just how this was to be squared with the reasoning of the earlier
cases was left unsaid. Perhaps, in contrast to Gitlow, deference to the
138. Vhitney, 274 U.S. at 367.
139. Id. at 373, 379 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring). Holmes's stress on the
marketplace of ideas, see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
suggested that freedom of expression was a means to an end. Brandeis, insisting that "[t]hose who
won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their
faculties," maintained that "[tihey valued liberty both as an end and as a means." Whitney, 274 U.S.
at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).

140. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 379 (Brandeis, J.,
joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
141. 274 U.S. 380 (1927).

142. Id at 385.
143. Id at 387.
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legislature was unnecessary because that body had never determined that

statements like Fiske's should be prohibited. Perhaps, in contrast to
Whitney, the facts were of constitutional magnitude because the fourteenth amendment forbade punishment of those who advocated change
by lawful means. But Sanford made no effort to explain.
Sanford reached his conclusion that the statute could not be applied
to Fiske, moreover, without even discussing the still unresolved question
whether the due process clause made freedom of expression limitations

applicable to the states. The most natural inference may be that Fiske
finally decided that it did. 144 Yet the Court nowhere said that freedom of
expression had been infringed; it spoke only in terms of the unspecified
"liberty" protected by the due process clause. 145 If by "liberty" the
Court meant freedom from a sentence of imprisonment, then Fiske may

not have been a free speech decision at all, but rather-though the conclusion that "the Act" was unconstitutional as "[t]hus applied" seems to

suggest the contrary-an unexplained application of the later-announced
general procedural principle that due process forbids conviction without
46
evidence that a crime has been committed.1
However mysterious its basis, Fiske seemed to suggest that the persistent hammering by Holmes and Brandeis was beginning to have an

effect: For the first time in its history, the Court had struck down an
effort to inflict punishment for the expression of ideas.1 47
144. Fiske's argument had been cast in freedom-of-expression terms, concluding with the statement that the applicability of speech and press guarantees to the states through the due process
clause was not being discussed at length because it had been established in Gitlow. Brief for the
Plaintiff in Error at 27, Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
145. Fiske, 274 U.S. at 387 ("Thus applied the Act is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
the police power of the State, unwarrantably infringing the liberty of the defendant in violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
146. See Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 204 (1960). But cf Arrowsmith v. Harmoning,
118 U.S. 194, 196 (1886) ("Certainly a State cannot be deemed guilty of a violation of [the due
process clause] simply because one of its courts. . . has made an erroneous decision."). Fiske had
in fact been sentenced to imprisonment. See Transcript of Record at 3, Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S.
380 (1927). The alternative explanation is that the Court understood the state court to have construed the statute not to require unlawful means despite its express terms, and held that the statute
so construed invaded freedom of expression. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 97, at 352; H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 615 (2d ed. 1973):
If a state may not, as a matter of federal constitutional law, punish particular conducte.g., simply arguing with a policeman-then it is clearly appropriate for the Supreme
Court to review and reverse where there is no evidence of any facts which might take the
conduct outside of constitutional protection. This is the teaching of Fiske v. Kansas ....
147. Both Holmes and Brandeis had gone along when the Court, without significant discussion,
held that the government of Puerto Rico could constitutionally punish a libel against its governor in
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 314 (1922). The Court seemed simply to assume that the first
amendment limited the Puerto Rico legislature. See id. at 314. The Court also reaffirmed the inapplicability of criminal jury guarantees to Puerto Rico, which the Court concluded had still not been
"incorporated" into the United States. See id. at 304-05; see also FullerII, supranote 20, at 873-80
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C. Other Bill of Rights Provisions.
1. Taking and Regulation. The fifth amendment bars taking
property for public use without compensation; it says nothing about regulation. The paradigm case in which compensation is required is the
appropriation of private land for the construction of government buildings. In light of historical practice, it is hardly credible that, by the apparently narrow and specific language of the amendment, the framers
meant to forbid all regulation of the use of property without compensation. Invoking the longstanding precedent of nuisance laws, the Court
before the Taft period had upheld such additional limitations as a ban on
the manufacture of liquor and on the making of bricks in a populated
area.148 Though substantive due process cases showed that the right to
use one's land was part of the bundle of rights that made up a property
interest, Justice Harlan had suggested long before that mere regulation
was not a "taking ... for the public benefit" because the government did
49
not appropriate or use the affected property.1
A rigid distinction according to the form of governmental intervention, however, would have destroyed the protective power of the clause.
To forbid an owner to exclude the public from his property, for example,
would effectively transfer the property to public use. 15 0 Some more functional test had to be devised to accomplish the purposes of the compensation clause without outlawing regulation altogether.
This was what Justice Holmes sought to do in his opinion for the
Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 15' Having granted the plaintiffs the right to the surface of its land, the company prepared to exercise
its reserved right to remove all the underlying coal. Relying on a later
statute forbidding mining that would cause subsidence of other people's
houses, the plaintiffs sought an injunction. By an eight-to-one vote the
(discussing earlier decisions on applicability of various constitutional provisions to insular
possessions).
148. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (city ordinance banning brick yards in certain
areas held valid exercise of police power); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (state legislation
banning manufacture of alcoholic beverages valid exercise of police power); see also D. CURRIE,
supra note 20, at 375-77; White, supra note 20 at 1132 n.103.
149. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887). Mugler properly distinguished Pumpelly
v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872), which had held the flooding of property by a
government dam to be a taking under the Wisconsin constitution, as a case in which the "property
was, in effect, required to be devoted to the use of the public" for the storage of surplus water.
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668. For examples of the position that the right of use was a property right, see
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 327 (1921), discussed supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text;
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 140 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting).
150. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36,46-48, 71-73 (1964) (giving inventive examples of actual "regulations" designed to circumvent technical requirement of a "taking").
151. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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Court held that, as applied to these facts, the statute took the company's
property without compensation.
Alert to the danger of the formal distinction suggested by Brandeis's
dissenting observation that the state had not "appropriate[d]" or
"use[d]" the coal company's property,1 5 2 Holmes protested that the effect was the same as if it had: The regulation practically transferred to
the surface owner an easement of support. 1 53 Although some regulation
without compensation was implicitly permitted because otherwise
"[g]overnment hardly could go on," this "implied limitation must have
its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone." 154 Thus, it
was the "general rule . . . that while property may be regulated to a

certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
15 5
taking."
And how was one to determine whether a particular regulation went
too far? "One fact for consideration," said Holmes, "is the extent of the
diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all
cases there must be ... compensation .... ,,156 In the present case, "the
extent of the taking is great. It purports to abolish what is recognized in
Pennsylvania as an estate in land . .
,,157 The difference between a
158
regulation and a taking was one of degree, not of kind.
Justice Brandeis objected that Holmes had misapplied his own test:
If we are to consider the value of the coal kept in place by the restriction, we should compare it with the value of all other parts of the
land.... For aught that appears the value of the coal kept in place by
the restriction may be negligible as compared with the value of the
whole property, or even as compared with that part of it which is represented by the coal ... which may be extracted despite the statute.15 9
Beyond this, as Brandeis also noted, Holmes's test appeared to contradict
earlier decisions that had allowed the complete destruction of property
values in liquor and oleomargarine to protect the public interest. 160 Finally, it is difficult to relate Holmes's test to any conceivable purpose of
the taking provision. That the state has taken a small bite rather than a
152. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
153. "To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same
effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." Id. at 414.

154. Id. at 413.
155. Id. at 415.
156. Id. at 413.
157. Id. at 414.

158. Id. at 416.
159. Id. at 419. For further criticism along these lines, see Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why
the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 566-69 (1984); Sax, supra note 150, at
60.
160. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 418 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S.
678, 682 (1888); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668, 669 (1887)).

94
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large one affects the amount of compensation; it does not alter the fact

that, as he suggested in the same opinion, it is unfair to place the burden
of a public benefit on the shoulders of the individual owner.' 6 1

Holmes also suggested that the public interest in forbidding the undermining of homes was not great: The statute "is not justified as a pro-

tection of personal safety. That could be provided for by notice." 162
Brandeis responded with a pointed reference to two of Holmes's own

earlier opinions stressing the need for deference to reasonable legislative
decisions. 163 Indeed-as in Gitlow-it is not easy to reconcile Holmes's

second-guessing of the adequacy of less intrusive alternatives with his
argument that a state could fairly find sterilization of shoddy insufficient
to prevent disease. 164 Elsewhere in the same opinion, moreover, Holmes

himself revealed a more fundamental objection to his apparent suggestion
that a sufficiently strong public interest would dispense with the need for

compensation for what otherwise would amount to a taking:

65

"The

protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes" a
161. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416. When property is actually appropriated for public use, this is
clearly the law: Not one square inch of land may be taken without compensation, even if the owner
remains in possession of the incomparably larger remaining portion of his property. See, e.g.,
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 n.16 (1982) (installation of
television cable facilities: "[Wihether the installation is a taking does not depend on whether the
volume of space that it occupies is bigger than a bread box."). The utilitarian argument that compensation serves to assure the efficiency of government actions by internalizing their costs does not
itself justify Holmes's test; as Professor Michelman has said, it would require compensation for
essentially all government-caused harms. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the EthicalFoundationsof "JustCompensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1967). For the
argument that the magnitude of the taking does relate to the taking clause's tendency to reduce the
risk that productive activity may be deterred by the fear of capricious government action, see id. at
1229-34.
162. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414. Nor did the statute protect the safety of lessees of surface rights
from coal companies, since it allowed undermining the company's own land. See id.; Rose, supra
note 159, at 571-73.
163. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 420 (citing Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914) (upholding ban on alien ownership of shotguns); Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358, 365
(1910) (upholding ban on burial within city)). Brandeis added: "[lit seems . . . clear that mere
notice of intention to mine would not in this connection secure the public safety." Id. at 422.
164. See supra text accompanying note 76 (discussing Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402
(1926)). Like the first amendment in Gitlow, and unlike the due process clause as construed by the
Court, the taking provision does not prohibit only unreasonable action. For Holmes's explanation of
this difference, see Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) (dissent); see also supra
text accompanying notes 67-73. Like the first amendment, however, the taking clause applies only
to the central government; cases involving state takings, as well as state limitations on speech, are
governed by the due process clause. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41
(1897); Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra
note 20, at 189-93.
165. "[W]e should think it clear that the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to
warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights." Mahon, 260
U.S. at 414; see also id. at 415 (distinguishing a requirement that miners leave pillars of coal standing
sufficient to prevent flooding as "requirement for the safety of employees invited into the mine").
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valid public purpose "but provides that it shall not be taken for public
use without compensation."' 166 By implying the use of a balancing test,
Holmes seemed to be saying property could be taken without compensa67
tion if there was sufficient public need.'
Holmes's arguments, in short, seem less than convincing. Moreover, Justice Brandeis by no means based his dissent on a purely formal
distinction between taking and regulation that would eviscerate the
clause. He drew, rather, on the established theory that had been employed by so ardent a protector of property rights as Justice Field to
explain-long before the taking clause was found embodied in the fourteenth amendment-why the prohibition of nuisances was not a deprivation of property without due process: "Coal in place is land; and the
right of the owner to use his land is not absolute. He may not so use it as
to create a public nuisance; and uses, once harmless, may, owing to
changed conditions, seriously threaten the public welfare."'' 68 Harlan
had said the same thing in 1887: "[A]Il property in this country is held
under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community."' 6 9 In the ordinary case, the ownership of property does not include the right to undermine a neighbor; 170 thus, in the
17 1
ordinary case, no property is taken when undermining is forbidden.
The facts of the Mahon case, however, seemed to take the case out
of this usual rule. As Holmes insisted, the company in selling surface
rights to the plaintiffs had expressly reserved the right to mine all the
coal.'17 2 The terms of the conveyance had negated the normal obligation
of support and given the company the extraordinary right to undermine
166. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
167. Such a conclusion "baffles" not only "legal commentators who take a neoclassical economic
approach," as Professor Rose argues, see supra note 159, at 593-94, but also those who believe, as
the taking clause seems to indicate, that the Philadelphia Convention adopted the "Benthamite point
of view" that the public must pay for the property it acquires. See id. at 594.
168. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 417; cf Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 145 (1887) (Field, J., dissenting)
("The doctrine that each one must so use his own as not to injure his neighbor-sic utere tuo ut
alienurn non loedas-is the rule by which every member of society must possess and enjoy his property. . . ."). See D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 372; T. COOLEY, supra note 45, at 573.
169. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887).
170. See, e.g., 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND OTHER INTERESTS IN LAND

§ 301 (1903).
171. Cf Rose, supra note 159, at 582 ("[N]oxious fumes may be abated without compensation

because the property owner never had a right to inflict noxious fumes on his neighbors, and consequently lost nothing by regulation."); B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONsTrrUTION 101-02 (1977) (humble example of the bicycle owner who rides over his neighbor's marigolds);
see also id. at 150-56 (no compensation required when taking is designed to prevent socially unacceptable practices).
172. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
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the plaintiffs' land.1 73 Thus, the argument that would support Brandeis's
position in the usual case failed in Mahon: The prohibition of undermining did deprive the company of a preexisting property right-unless the

right to reserve such an interest had been qualified from the outset.
As Brandeis once again neatly pointed out, earlier Holmes decisions

suggested that it had been: Despite the clause forbidding impairment of
contracts, no one could remove a subject from the police power by making a contract about it. 174 Indeed, decisions under the taking clause itself

had gone beyond permitting the enforcement of duties imposed on landowners by the common law. They had upheld the imposition of new and

analogous duties, such as the duty not to make or sell liquor, on the
broader theory that the ownership of property, like the right to contract,

was limited not only by existing laws, but also by a general governmental

175
power to legislate for the prevention of harm.
Brandeis did not explicitly explain how to curtail a police power
qualification before it destroyed the taking clause. In answering the
Court's suggestion that a provision requiring that miners leave coal pil-

lars along the property line to prevent flooding of adjacent mines was
justified by "an average reciprocity of advantage," 1 76 however, Brandeis
drew a distinction that would serve the purpose:
Reciprocity of advantage is an important consideration, and may even
be an essential, where the State's power is exercised for the purpose of
conferring benefits upon the property of a neighborhood, as in drainage projects,... or upon adjoining owners, as by party wall provisions
.... But where the police power is exercised, not to confer benefits
upon property owners, but to protect the public from detriment and
173. See H. TIFFANY, supra note 170, § 309 ("[T]he owner of the surface of land may grant or
release to the owner of subjacent soil or minerals the right to work or mine the latter, even though
this causes a disturbance or sinking of the surface.").
174. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 420-21 (citing Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349
(1908)); see also Fuller I, supra note 20, at 334-35 (discussing Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473
(1905)). Without responding directly to Brandeis's invocation of his own earlier opinions, Holmes
seemed to limit those opinions by acknowledging for the first time that their reasoning posed a threat
to the very existence of the constitutional provision: "As long recognized, some values are enjoyed
under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation
must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
175. E.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665, 669 (1887). Compare Cooley's formulation of
the relation between the police power and property under the similarly worded due process clause,
quoted supra note 45. But for this implicit limitation, the Court might well have had to strike down
residential zoning laws as takings without compensation, since they went beyond the analogous law
of nuisance. As it was, the Court upheld zoning against a due process attack on the basis of the
nuisance analogy without even discussing the taking issue. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), discussedsupra note 79 and accompanying text. For the alternative argu-

ment that zoning was justified by implicit compensation in kind-though hardly well tailored to the
facts of the Euclid case, where zoning allegedly reduced the value of the affected land by three
quarters-see infra text accompanying notes 176-79.
176. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (citing Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914)).
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danger, there is, in my opinion, no room for considering reciprocity of

advantage. 177
"Reciprocity of advantage" is compensation in kind; Brandeis and
Holmes both seemed to be saying that it would justify an actual taking. 178 But in Brandeis's view, there was a taking only when the owner
was required to benefit his neighbor, not when he was forbidden to harm
him. It is true that one may suffer economic injury in either case, 1 79 but
nuisance law has distinguished the two for centuries. It is on this distinction that Brandeis built: It is unfair to require an individual property
owner to contribute his land for a post office, but it is not unfair to make
180
him stop polluting his neighbors.
Borderline cases will prove refractory on Brandeis's test, and
Mahon was a borderline case. To undermine the Mahons' land would
harm them; to forbid undermining would give them a right to support
that they had not paid for. That the Mahons had been compensated for
forgoing that right does seem at least to shift the equities; even in Brandeis's terms, a strong case can be made for saying the statute gave the
Mahons a benefit for which they had not bargained.
Not long after Mahon, the Court in Miller v. Schoene unanimously
upheld, against a taking objection, a statute requiring the destruction of
ornamental cedar trees infected with a disease damaging to nearby apple
orchards."' Holmes was silent, although the diminution in value, which
he had so heavily stressed in Mahon, was obviously great if the cedars,
like the right to undermine houses, were to be considered in isolation. In
Brandeis's terms, while the destruction of the cedars could be said to
confer a benefit on the apple growers, the proximity of the case to traditional nuisance law seemed to suggest, as in the zoning case, that the
statute should be upheld.
Ignoring Mahon altogether, Justice Stone announced a new test that
avoided choosing between two equally accurate characterizations:
177. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 422.
178. See Rose, supra note 159, at 581.
179. See Coase,supra note 79, at 2 (requiring one to avoid causing injuries to another may inflict
economic loss on the enjoined party); Sax, supra note 150, at 48-50 ("Actually the problem is not
one of noxiousness or harm-creating activity at all; rather it is a problem of inconsistency between
perfectly innocent and independently desirable uses.")
180. See also Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 428-29 (1935) (Brandeis, J.)
(holding unconstitutional a requirement that railroad pay for elimination of grade crossing where

reason was promotion of highway speed rather than safety: "Etihe promotion of public convenience
will not justify requiring of a railroad. . . the expenditure of money, unless it can be shown that a
duty to provide the particular convenience rests upon it"); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in
Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme CourtExpropriationLaw, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63, 73-81. Seen
in this light, the taking clause and the police power can comfortably coexist as complementary components of the property owner's general right to be left alone.
181. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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[T]he state was under the necessity of making a choice between the

preservation of one class of property and that of the other wherever
both existed in dangerous proximity. It would have been none the less

a choice if, instead of enacting the present statute, the state, by doing
nothing, had permitted serious injury to the apple orchards within its
borders to go unchecked. When forced to such a choice the state does
not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction
of one class of property in order to save another .... 182

Elaborating on this reasoning, Professor Sax concluded that no
compensation should be required when the government arbitrated between conflicting uses of adjacent properties. 183 Like Brandeis's distinction, this test serves to separate the abatement of a nuisance from the

construction of a post office, where the landowner's activities do not interfere with the use of government land. 184 Yet Professor Sax would permit the government also to favor the perpetrator of a nuisance on the
ground that to protect the victim is to limit the other's right to use his
own property.' 85 On the assumption that the nuisance had previously
been prohibited, why the transfer of rights involved in this case is more
consistent with the constitutional purpose of avoiding arbitrary imposi-

tion of burdens than in the case of the post office is not altogether
86

clear. 1

The elusiveness of a logically satisfying treatment of the regulations
in Mahon and Miller underscores the refractory nature of the problem.
However imperfect their solutions, Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone ren182. Id. at 279.
183. Sax, Takings, Private Propertyand PublicRights, 81 YALE L.. 149, 165 (1971).
184. Cf Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928) (Butler, J.) (strikig down as an uncompensated taking a requirement that railroad make its property available for
taxi stand). Brandeis, joined by Holmes, concurred in a separate opinion. Decided the same day as
Miller, this case can be reconciled with Miller by employing Professor Sax's distinction, because the
terminal did not interfere with the use of the cab owner's property. In the language of Brandeis's
dissent in Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416, the railroad was required to confer a benefit on the cab owners.
185. See Sax, supra note 183, at 164-66 (distinguishing between requiring adjoining owner put
up with airport noise and requiring same owner to surrender land for new runway),
186. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1726 ('r[T]he seeds of a destruction of the eminent domain
clause may lie within the Miller Court's statement."). In an earlier article, Professor Sax had argued
that compensation should be required only if the government acted in an "enterprise" capacity as
opposed to reconciling private disputes, on the ground that the risk of arbitrary action that gave
birth to the compensation requirement was at its height when the government acted to promote its
own interest. Sax, supra note 150, at 62-67. As Sax's later example of the new runway seems to
acknowledge, however, it is also arbitrary to give one person's property to another without compensation. Sax, supra note 183, at 164-66. Indeed, the independent "public use" requirement has been
held to forbid such a transfer even if compensation is paid. For criticism of both versions of Sax's
test on grounds of unfairness, see Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 165, 177-82 (1974) (urging compensation when justifiable expectations of owner are frustrated
by government action).
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99

dered major services by their provocative exploration of the infuriating
borderland between regulation and taking.
2. Searches and Seizures. Like the other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, the fourth amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable searches
and seizures" applied only to the central government and not to the
states.18 7 Partly for this reason, and partly because of the long absence of
any provision for appellate review of federal convictions,'" 8 the amend-

ment had not figured prominently in Supreme Court jurisprudence
before Taft's appointment in 1921.
The Court had begun by giving the clause a broad construction in
Boyd v. United States in 1886, holding that it prohibited a court order to
produce evidence even though there was no physical invasion of the defendant's premises or person. 189 Gouled v. United States had held the
amendment applicable to an entry accomplished by fraud and had completed the development of the rule requiring exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained.' 90 In other respects, the amendment remained largely
unexplored.
The ratification of the prohibition amendment in 1919, however, led
to an unprecedented increase in federal criminal enforcement and to a
corresponding spate of important search and seizure decisions during the
Taft period.
187. Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1856); see D. CtRaE, supra note 20, at 189-93
(discussing Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (taking clause)). The Court had
reaffirmed this conclusion after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. See, eg., Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
188. See Evarts Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) ("capital or otherwise infamous crimes"); Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch.
113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655, 656 (writ of error in capital cases); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat.
73, 84 (making final judgments in "civil actions" reviewable in district or circuit court); see also H.
HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 146, at 1539-41.
189. 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 444-47.
190. 255 U.S. 298 (1921); see also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 39192 (1920) (refusing to subpoena evidence that had been returned after unlawful search); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (upholding a search victim's right to recover property unlawfully
seized):
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right
to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus
placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.
Id. at 393. In Gouled itself, where the principle was extended to require the exclusion of evidence,
Justice Clarke relied not on the argument of enforcing the fourth amendment, but on unconvincing
dicta in the Boyd opinion suggesting that the introduction of evidence unlawfully seized would violate the fifth amendment's ban on compulsory self-incrimination. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 306. The fifth
amendment ground was repeated regularly in the opinions of the Taft period. See, eg., Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1925).
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a. Open fields. The first case, Hester v. United States, was decided in 1924.191 The evidence objected to had been obtained by revenue
agents who had apparently entered private land without permission. Justice Holmes disposed of the fourth amendment objection in two
sentences: "[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not
extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the
192
house is as old as the common law."
Cited for the traditional distinction was a passage from Blackstone
dealing with the law of burglary. 193 The law of trespass, as Holmes acknowledged, protected open fields as well, 194 and-unless the text compelled this conclusion-it was not clear why burglary was a more
appropriate analogy. The celebrated English case on which Boyd had so
heavily relied had described permissible searches as an exception to the
law of trespass, and Boyd itself had said the amendment was designed to
protect the "indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property"195 -which seemed broad enough to embrace the premises in Hester. Since one of the essential prerogatives of the landowner is
the right to exclude others, one might well argue that land ownership
creates the very sort of legitimate expectation of privacy that the amend196
ment was designed to protect.
The obvious stumbling block is the text. Pointedly quoted by
Holmes, it protects not all property but only "persons, houses, papers,
and effects"; and the last term is generally taken to refer to personal
rather than real property. 197 As noted by three dissenters when Hester
was reaffirmed half a century later, a series of decisions beginning in 1967
had renounced this literal interpretation in an effort to effectuate the purposes of the provision. 98 It is possible that the House of Representa191. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
192. Id. at 59.
193. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *223-26.

194. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58.
195. 116 U.S. at 630 (citing "celebrated" case of Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials

1029 (1765)).
196. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 189-95 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 177 n.7 (opinion of the Court).
198. Id. at 186-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
which had held electronic surveillance of public telephone booths within fourth amendment and
echoing Chief Justice Marshall's insistence in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407
(1819), that the Constitution should not be read like a detailed code). The majority in Oliver explained Katz as based upon the amendment's protection of "persons" from unreasonable search.
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176 n.6. A literal interpretation of "houses" might exclude not only open fields
but also commercial and industrial buildings from the scope of the amendment. Yet Holmes himself
had struck down a search of business premises in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.

385 (1920), without adverting to any difficulty. Perhaps it sufficed that in Silverthorne, as in the
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tives' unexplained substitution of the term "effects" for Madison's
originally proposed reference to "property" reflected a deliberate judgment that the privacy interest in real property other than "houses" was
insufficient to justify further limiting the authority of government to investigate crime. 199 A Court not convinced of this, however, could easily
have read the language more broadly after having held that a court order
constituted a "search," a regulation of land use a "taking," and a photograph a "writing" within the copyright clause. 20° Since Holmes himself
had written the opinion in the taking case less than three years before, it
is not obvious that he really found the text decisive; and, as so often was
the case, he did not say what else was on his mind. 20 1
b.

Vehicles and houses. Whatever the limits of the types of real

property protected by the fourth amendment, the Court had no difficulty
in treating an automobile as falling within the "effects" embraced by the
search and seizure provision. The question in the 1925 case of Carrollv.
United States was what made a search of protected effects
"unreasonable." 20 2
The opinion was long and tedious, but the holding was clear: A
moving automobile could be stopped and searched without a warrant if
20 3
there was probable cause to believe it was carrying illegal beverages.
To a substantial degree this conclusion was based upon a longstanding
usual search of business premises, the objects searched and seized within the building constituted
"effects."
199. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1984); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 41 (1966); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. x (1789).

200. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 413-15 (1922), discussedsupra text accompanying notes 110-48; Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co.
v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 435-36, 444-45.
201. To hold all private property protected by the fourth amendment would not make every
observation of activity on such premises an unreasonable search. Much that is done outdoors on
private land can be seen from outside its boundaries, and it does not seem unreasonable to allow the
government to see what the owner has knowingly exposed to public view. See infra text accompanying notes 220-22 (discussing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)). Beyond this, it does
not seem unreasonable for an enforcement officer to enter private property that has been opened to
the public by the owner, as in the case of many business establishments. See Air Pollution Variance
Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974) (inspector not required to have warrant to
enter property held open to public). The Court did not reach this issue in Hester because it held the
premises in question wholly outside fourth amendment protection. Hester, 265 U.S. at 59; see Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 193-94 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
202. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
203. Id. at 153-56. McReynolds and Sutherland, in dissent, protested that, among other things,
there was no probable cause: "Has it come about that merely because a man once agreed to deliver
whisky, but did not, he may be arrested whenever thereafter he ventures to drive an automobile on
the road to Detroit!" Id. at 174. For similar criticism, see J.LANDYNSKI, supra note 199, at 89-90
(citing Black, A Critique of the CarrollCase, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 1068 (1929)). For the majority's
argument that the prohibition agents in Carrollhad probable cause, see Carroll,267 U.S. at 159-62.
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congressional practice2°4 that, as a leading student of the amendment had
observed, 20 5 had largely been confined to searches at or near international borders-a context in which the Court acknowledged that the ordinary rules did not apply. 20 6 More persuasive was the Court's
explanation of the basis for the distinction it thought Congress had traditionally drawn: In the case of a vehicle or vessel, "it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
'20 7
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
On the Court's explicit assumption that it was "unreasonable" to
search without a warrant whenever it was practicable to get one,205 the
Carrollexception made some sense, 20 9 as did the similarly supported exception for warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest, which the
Court confirmed in dictum in the same opinion.2 10 The assumption was
204. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 150-53 (listing statutes dating from as early as 1789 authorizing
warrantless searches of vessels or vehicles and issuance of warrants to search buildings).
205. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 199, at 90 (citing Black, supra note 203, at 1075, and criticizing
relevance of Taft's examples).
206. Carroll,267 U.S. at 154 (explaining that "national self protection" justified searching vehicles at border without even probable cause). The 1789 statute cited in Carrollwas not strictly limited to ships entering the country, but later cases have extended the notion of somewhat relaxed rules
for international travelers miles beyond the actual border, especially when ships are involved. See
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588-93 (1983) (upholding high-seas inspection
without probable cause and stressing "need to deter or apprehend smugglers"); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976) (upholding questioning of vehicle occupants by Border Patrol agents at fixed checkpoints without probable cause). Early statutes dealing with liquor in
Indian country, see Carroll, 267 U.S. at 152-53, may have been based upon similar reasoning, and a
statute dealing with searches inAlaska antedated congressional recognition that the Bill of Rights
applied to that territory. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 199, at 90 n.12; Black, supra note 203, at
1068. In light of the discussion that follows, it may also be significant that the statutes authorizing
warrants to search buildings did not expressly forbid searching them without warrants.
207. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
208. Id. at 156.
209. See Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. P'r. L. REv. 227,
275-77 (1984), which notes the absence of any basis in Carroll for arresting the occupants of a
vehicle before a search, and comments on the Court's thoughtless extension of Carroll, in Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970), to a situation in which a car had been impounded after arrest, on
the ground that "mobility of the car . . . still obtained at the stationhouse." Taft's argument is
impaired to some degree by the fact that the articles sought may also be removed from a house
before a warrant can be obtained.
210. Carroll,267 U.S. at 158. Applied two years later in United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563
(1927) (Brandeis, J.)
(alternative holding), this rule has generally been justified on the ground that
immediate action is necessary to protect the arresting officer from concealed weapons and to prevent
the destruction of evidence. See, eg., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). Given this
rationale, it is not surprising that the Court refused to find that a search of one house was incident to
an arrest made in another. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30-31 (1925) (Butler, J.). For the
same reason, however, it does seem surprising that on this theory the same Justices allowed a search
of the entire establishment in which the defendant had been arrested, Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (Butler, J.). As later cases would recognize, there was no risk that a defendant
in custody would employ or destroy items wholly outside his reach. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762.68.

Vol. 1986:65]

THE SUPREME COURT- 1921-1930

itself confirmed a few months later in Agnello v. United States,2 11 in
which a unanimous Court held that "[t]he search of a private dwelling
without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws. ' 212
so; he
As Justice Butler wrote, the Court had long assumed that this was
213
matter.
original
an
as
conclusion
his
justify
to
effort
made no
Later observers have explained that the fourth amendment expresses
a preference for warrants in order to interpose the judgment of an independent magistrate between the investigator and the citizen.21 4 More
recently, however, support has been growing for the argument that
Agnello "stood the fourth amendment on its head": "Far from looking
at the warrant as a protection against unreasonable searches, [the founding fathers] saw it as an authority for unreasonable and oppressive
searches, and sought to confine its issuance and execution in line with the
stringent requirements applicable to common-law warrants for stolen

goods .... -215
There is nothing in the text of the amendment to answer the question whether warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.
Respected Justices have argued, however, that to allow the police to
search without a warrant whenever there is probable cause would leave
the amendment a hollow shell: The limits on the issuance of warrants
would do no good if warrants were not required. 21 6 The factual basis of a
counterargument is found in Chief Justice Taft's opinion for the Court in
Carroll: A warrant "protects the seizing officer against a suit for damages" even if the search is later held unlawful. 21 7 The citizen already had
some protection against warrantless searches because the officer was liable in tort for acting unreasonably; 218 the warrant clause served the pur211. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
212. Id. at 32.
213. See id. at 32-33.
214. See, eg., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981) (Stewart, J.); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (Jackson, J.).
215. T. TAYLOR, TWo STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATON 23-24, 41 (1969); see
also Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 49, 72 & n.56. For judicial
acknowledgement of this argument, see Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 608-11 (1980) (White, J., dissenting); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).

216. See, eg., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1958) (Harlan, J.); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 17 (1948) (Jackson, J.). As noted, supra note 215, Justice Harlan

later acknowledged there were reasons to reexamine this position.
217. Carroll,267 U.S. at 156. See T. COOLEY, supranote 45, at 303. In other words, one might
view the warrant provision as a means of ensuring that warrants were no longer used to undermine
the common law requirement, written into the amendment's ban on unreasonable searches, that
there be probable cause. Taft did not appear to perceive that this cut against his premise that a
warrant was required whenever practicable.
218. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156 ("In cases where seizure is impossible except without warrant,

the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court probable cause.").
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pose of limiting the occasions when a warrant could deprive the citizen of
this protection. Thus, the warrant provision makes ample sense in light
of the history of abusive warrants that prompted adoption of the amendment, even if no warrant is ever required; thus one argument for the
Court's conclusion in Agnello evaporates.
The mere fact that the opposing argument is not absurd, however,
does not prove it correct. It would have been entirely consistent for the
framers to seek both to prevent the abuse of warrants and to secure such
additional protection as comes from the interposition of a disinterested
magistrate-however ephemeral that protection may be or have become
in practice. If, as is sometimes said, the reasonableness of some searches
and seizures depended upon a warrant at common law, 2 19 Agnello may
have been right after all.
c. Searchlightsand wiretaps. In United States v. Lee, a 1927 decision, the Court held that the Carroll principle permitting warrantless
searches of vehicles on probable cause was applicable to vessels, and it
confirmed Carroll'sdictum permitting warrantless searches incident to a
lawful arrest. 220 More interesting, however, was the unanimous conclusion in the same case that the use of a searchlight to reveal the contents
of a boat to persons outside it was permissible because it was not a
"search" at all. 22 1 Brandeis's argument was brief: Using a searchlight
was like using a field glass, and Hester was cited by way of unexplained
comparison.
At first glance, the Court's conclusion seems to follow a fortiori
from Hester: If one may trespass upon private property to view what is
visible there, surely it is less offensive to view it from outside, where one
has a right to be. Yet Hester was based upon the conclusion that open
fields were not "effects" protected by the search provision. Since vessels
were assumed to be "effects," Hester did not authorize trespassing upon
them to discover evidence, and the analogy fails.
Brandeis cited no authority for his conclusion that the term
"search" should be narrowly defined, and he did not say why the use of
either searchlights or field glasses did not qualify. In the literal sense a
219. See, eg., J. SCARBORO & J. WHITE, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CASES,
QUESTIONS, AND NOTES 306-11 (1977). John Adams's notes of the 1761 Massachusetts writs-ofassistance case attribute to James Otis the argument that the home could never be invaded without a
warrant, and a 1762 newspaper article, also attributed to Otis, fulminated against general writs even
on the express assertion that they provided no immunity from damages for wrongful intrusion, on
the ground that they left the decision to every "petty officer." See M. SMITH, THE WRITS OF
ASSISTANCE CARE 544, 563 (1978).
220. 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927).
221. Id. at 563 (alternative holding).
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search had been made: The officers had examined the deck of the boat in

an effort to find contraband. It would have been fair enough to hold that
such a search was not "unreasonable," since one who puts his belongings
where they can easily be seen can hardly have a legitimate expectation of
keeping them secret. Brandeis's choice of the ostensibly more sweeping
ground that there had been no "search" at all may perhaps be defended
on the ground that the framers would not have wanted to subject the
policemen watching passersby to the usual paraphernalia of fourth

amendment inquiry. 222 By neglecting to specify just why there had been
no search in Lee, however, Brandeis left the opinion open to the interpre-

tation that there could be no search without physical intrusion into "persons, papers, houses, [or] effects."
The chickens came home to roost the next year in Olmstead v.
United States, where the Court, over four dissents, allowed the use of
evidence obtained by tapping telephone wires without a warrant. 223 Said
Chief Justice Taft, after another tiresome recapitulation of irrelevant decisions:224 Hester made clear that the phone company's wires were not

among the speaker's protected person, papers, houses, or effects, and Lee
established that there had been no "search" of the speaker's "person" or
225
"house" because there had been no trespass.

Justice Brandeis's anguished dissent is an eloquent exposition of the
values protected by the fourth amendment: "The makers of our Constitution ... sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men."' 226 His conclusion: To effectu222. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8, 14-15 (1973) (defining a search as intrusion
upon reasonable expectations of privacy); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REv. 349, 395 (1974) (noting that "to subject [a broad range of police practices] to fourth
amendment control but exempt them from the warrant or probable cause requirements would
threaten the integrity of the structure of internal fourth amendment doctrines"); Stone, The Scope of
the Fourth Amendment: Privacyand the Police Use ofSpies, Secret Agents, and Informers, 1976 AM.
B. FOUND. REsEARCH J.1193, 1211-12. But see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding a stopand-frisk encounter to be a search and seizure but finding neither warrant nor probable cause required); Amsterdam, supra, at 393 ("[T]o exclude any particular police activity from coverage is
essentially to exclude it from judicial control and from the command of reasonableness, whereas to
include it is to do no more than say that it must be conducted in a reasonable manner."). Compare
the question whether every communicative act is "speech" subject to the stringent standards of the
first amendment. See, eg., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (burning of draft
card).

223.
224.
202.
225.
226.

277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Cf Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), discussedsupra text accompanying note
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-66.
Id. at 478.
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ate these goals, "every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be

deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

'227

The words of the

amendment, he insisted, were no barrier: The Court had already con-

strued them liberally by holding them to include, among other things, a
court order to produce evidence in Boyd.228
All of this was very persuasive as an original matter. As Taft argued, however, it came a little late. Brandeis and Holmes-who also
dissented in Olmstead but on other grounds 229-had laid the foundation

for the exclusion of wiretapping by their heedlessly narrow interpretations of "houses," "effects," and "searches" in Lee and in Hester.230 Had
they based these decisions on the ground that searchlight and open field

searches were not "unreasonable," or that a "search" involved the invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy, 231 wiretapping could easily

232
have been distinguished. Contrary to the Chief Justice's suggestion, it
does not seem reasonable to conclude that one who speaks over the telephone intends to broadcast his words to the public generally. Nor should
the fact that wiretapping was known to be a technical possibility at the

time Olmstead spoke require the opposite conclusion. If it did, as Brandeis suggested, new inventions such as x-ray cameras or powerful microphones could obliterate the amendment's protection. 2 33 After Lee had
held that the use of a searchlight was not a "search" at all, however, it
227. Id. For criticism of Olmstead on essentially the same grounds, see Stone, supra note 222, at
1201- 11 (elaborating on nature of privacy protected): "iT]he amendments protection of privacy
should properly be viewed as extending primarily, if not exclusively, to preservation of the individual's interest in keeping information about him away from the prying hands, eyes, and ears of government." Id. at 1209.
228. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 476; see also id. at 472-73 (invoking other examples of broad construction of constitutional provisions).
229. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469-70. Holmes agreed with Brandeis's alternative argument,
id. at 479-85, that on the basis of the equitable clean hands doctrine the courts should exclude
evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of state criminal law. Justice Stone agreed with
both dissenting arguments; Justice Butler, with that based on the fourth amendment. Id. at 485-88.
230. See Amsterdam, supra note 222, at 381-82.
231. See supra note 222.
232. "The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument with
connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside. . . ." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at
466.
233. Ways may some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers
from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to
expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and
related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. . . . Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of
individual security?
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Amsterdam, supra note 222, at 384.
Compare Holmes's employment of a similar argument to ignore the literal terms of the taking clause
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), discussed supra text accompanying notes
152-55.
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was necessary to explain why a wiretap was; and if there was no search,
one never reached the question whether the officers' action was
234
unreasonable.

II.
A.

FEDERALISM

Maritime Cases.

As in earlier years, the Court during Taft's tenure was confronted
with a flock of cases raising the question whether state law was contrary
to the negative implications of the commerce clause. Apart from a dis-

sent by Justice Stone presaging a general recognition that in deciding
whether a burden on commerce was "direct" or "indirect" the Court had
really been balancing the state's interest in regulation against the national
interest in freedom of commerce, 23 5 these decisions added little to previ2 36
ous understanding of the law.
Of somewhat greater interest were developments in Justice McReynolds's related doctrine that the grant of admiralty jurisdiction im237
plicitly limited state power to regulate maritime transactions.
Reaffirming precedent allowing state wrongful death laws to provide re-

lief in the case of maritime torts, McReynolds explained in Western Fuel
Co. v. Garcia that the subject was "maritime and local in character" and
that use of the state death law would not, in terms of the governing standard, "work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, nor interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity
234. Brandeis was notably reticent about Hester and Lee, explaining unexpectedly that the former had involved "voluntary disclosures by the defendant" (which had not been the Court's basis of
decision) and following this statement with the unelaborated direction to "[elompare . . . United
States v. Lee." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 n. 11. This passage may have been a belated attempt to say
that the earlier cases had involved searches, but that they had been reasonable. Or perhaps Brandeis
meant that a "search" was the invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy. Cf.United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (looking in part to the degree of intrusiveness in concluding that
subjecting luggage to a dog trained to sniff out narcotics was not a "search" at all); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (stressing expectation of privacy in overruling Olmstead and
finding warrantless electronic eavesdropping an unreasonable search-without saying whether of
persons, papers, houses, or effects).
235. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44-45 (1927) (Stone, J.,dissenting); cf Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783-84 (1945) (Stone, C.J.) ("rT]he state interest is outweighed
by the interest of the nation in an adequate, economical and efficient railway transportation service
236. See also Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925) (Brandeis, J.)(state may not
refuse license for interstate trucking on ground that existing service is adequate); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596-97 (1923) (Van Devanter, J.) (reaffirming that state cannot require
discrimination against out-of-state customers in sale of natural gas).
237. See White, supra note 20, at 1139-45 (discussing, for example, Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205 (1917)).
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'23 8

Why the sub-

ject was "local," and why there was no impermissible disruption of uniformity, was not explained.

A month later, in GrantSmith-PorterShip Co. v. Rohde,239 the maritime-but-local doctrine cropped up once again. A carpenter had been
injured while completing the construction of a ship on navigable waters;

the Court held his action for damages under the general maritime law
was precluded by a state statute making workmen's compensation his

only remedy. The case, wrote McReynolds, was controlled by Garcia:
Though the tort was maritime, "the application of the local law cannot

'240
materially affect any rules of the sea whose uniformity is essential.
Though the terms he employed were the same in both cases, it is
clear that what made the matter in Rohde "local" was not what had done
so in Garcia. Rohde's case was "local" because of the nature of his em-

ployment: "The contract for constructing 'The Alhala' was nonmari-

time, and although the incompleted structure upon which the accident
occurred was lying in navigable waters, neither Rohde's general employ-

ment, nor his activities at the time had any direct relation to navigation
or commerce.

'24 1

McReynolds distinguished earlier decisions forbidding

application of workmen's compensation laws to maritime cases, including the seminal Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,242 because in "each of
them the employment or contract was maritime in nature and the rights

and liabilities of the parties were prescribed by general rules of maritime
law essential to its proper harmony and uniformity.

'243

In contrast, it

cannot have been the nature of the worker's employment in Garcia that
made his case "local," for he, like Jensen, had been a stevedore, and the
238. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921). As the Court added, it seemed to
follow from the fact that recovery for wrongful death was based on state law (despite the traditional
rule that normally time limitations were a "procedural" matter governed by the law of the forum,
see REsTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 604-605 (1934)) that no relief could be granted after
expiration of the applicable state statute of limitations. Garcia, 257 U.S. at 242-44 (invoking the
similar conclusion of The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213-14 (1886)). To justify the opposite result
would have required finding either that state death laws were utilized in maritime cases only to
provide a framework for enforcing a federal policy or that the state time limitation had been intended only to reduce the docket burdens of state courts. See Currie,Federalismand the Admiralty:
The Devil's Own Mess, 1960 Su. CT.REV.158, 191-93, 192 n.173.
239. 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
240. Id. at 477.
241. Id. at 475-76; see also id. at 477 ("Here the parties']. . . rights and liabilities had no direct
relation to navigation, and the application of the local law cannot materially affect any rules of the
sea whose uniformity is essential."); accord Miller's Indem. Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59
(1926) (McReynolds, J.)(allowing compensation award in death of diver employed by local shipbuilder). See Morrison, Workmen's Compensationand the MaritimeLaw, 38 YALE L.J. 472,491-99
(1929).
242. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
243. Rohde, 257 U.S. at 477.
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defendant had been the operator of a vessel. 244 It must have been the
nature of the wrongful death law itself that allowed its application to a
person whose employment was "direct[ly] relat[ed] to navigation or
commerce." 245
McReynolds did not explain why there was no need for uniformity

with regard either to wrongful death laws or to the rights and duties of
shipbuilders. We can help him: If the concern is that persons engaged in

traffic from one place to another should not be subjected to a variety of
confusing or conflicting obligations, it is important that the death law
apparently imposed no new rules of conduct and that the shipbuilder and
2 46
his employee did not travel.
This may explain why state law was permitted to operate in cases

such as Garcia, in which maritime law expressed no contrary policy. It
does not explain, however, why McReynolds was willing to allow the
state to deprive Rohde of a right to relief given by federal law. Uniform244. See Garcia, 257 U.S. at 238-39; Jensen, 244 U.S. at 207-08.
245. McReynolds appeared to confirm the two disparate senses of the maritime-but-local concept in allowing a state wrongful death action on behalf of a repairman who had fallen from a barge:
While state compensation law had applied to Rohde because of the local nature of his employment,
"[h]ere the circumstances are very different"-though in both cases state law applied-because "the
rights and liabilities of the parties are matters which have a direct relation to navigation and commerce." Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479, 480-81 (1923).
246. See The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185, 195 (1903) (the master's "position is such that it is almost
impossible for him to acquaint himself with the laws of each individual State he may visit, and he has
a right to suppose that the general maritime law applies to him and his ship, wherever she may go.").
As Brandeis protested when the Court soon afterwards refused to extend the maritime-but-local
doctrine to a compensation claim on behalf of a longshoreman against his equally stationary employer, the uniformity argument is as weak in such a case as in Rohde itself, although a maritime
contract as well as a tort is involved: "How can a law of New York, making a New York employer
liable to a New York employee for every occupational injury occurring within the State, mar the
proper harmony of the assumed general maritime law in its interstate and international relations,
when neither a ship, nor a shipowner, is the employer affected. . . ?" Washington v. W.C. Dawson
& Co., 264 U.S. 219, 231 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); accord Morrison, supra note 241, at 482,
502. McReynolds did not respond; reaffirming his earlier unexpected holding that Congress lacked
the power to remove the uniformity requirement which was designed to serve the very federal interests the admiralty and necessary and proper clauses had entrusted to Congress, see Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), discussed in White, supra note 20, at 1144-45, he obtusely
echoed the inapplicable concern of The Roanoke that "[tihe confusion and difficulty, if vessels were
compelled to comply with the local statutes at every port, are not difficult to see." Washington, 264
U.S. at 228. See also London Guar. & Accident Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 279 U.S. 109
(1929) (Taft, C.J.) (no state workmen's compensation for seaman employed wholly in intrastate
commerce); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahli, 266 U.S. 449 (1925) (McReynolds, J.)(denying
application of state scaffolding law in suit by repairman against local employer for injury suffered
while repairing ship in navigable waters). Indeed, as Brandeis seemed to suggest, application of the
uniformity doctrine under such circumstances had the perverse effect of creating disuniformity by
making the obligation to pay compensation depend upon whether the accident occurred on the ship
or on the shore. If the accident occurred on shore, it was subject to state law because it was not
within the admiralty jurisdiction. See Washington, 264 U.S. at 229 (citing State Indus. Comm'n v.
Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922)).
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ity was but one aspect of the Jensen principle, and the less obvious one at

that; before Rohde it had been thought fundamental that state law could
not take away what maritime law had given; because federal law was
supreme. 24 7
B.

CongressionalAuthority.

1. The Child Labor Tax Case.

In 1918, the Court in Hammer v.

Dagenharthad struck down, over four dissents, a congressional attempt

to ban the interstate transportation of goods made in factories employing
children, finding the federal law an effort to meddle with the subject of
manufacturing-an area reserved to the states. 24 8 Immediately after this

decision, Congress imposed a ten per cent tax on the incomes of persons
249

employing child labor; the Court struck down the tax as well.
The obvious effort to circumvent Hammer v. Dagenhart made the

result less than surprising. Stressing the fact that the tax was payable
only for knowing actions and without regard to the number of children
247. See White, supra note 20, at 1139-45 (discussing Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
(1917), and other cases). Parallelling the rise of the maritime-but-local doctrine permitting additional state regulation of maritime affairs was the unanimous decision in Metcalf& Eddy v. Mitchell,
269 U.S. 514 (1926) (Stone, 3.). Mitchell took a fairly relaxed view of intergovernmental immunity
by permitting federal taxation of income derived from contracts with a state. But see Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 584 (1895) (holding that United States could not tax
income from state securities), discussed in FullerI, supra note 20, at 350-52; Collector v. Day, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870) (holding that United States could not tax state officers' salaries), discussed
in D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 355. On the other hand, split decisions of the Taft period actually
expanded the converse immunity of the United States from state taxation that had been established
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at
160-68. See McCallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620 (1929) (Sutherland, J.) (effectively overruling Society for Savings v. Coite, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 594 (1868), which had permitted a state to
include income from federal securities in determining the amount of a privilege tax on the persuasive
ground that constitutional immunities may not be evaded by labeling). See also Panhandle Oil Co. v,
Mississippi ex rel Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 222 (1928) (Butler, J.) (holding sales to the United States
immune from state taxation); Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928) (McReynolds, J.) (holding tax
on patent royalties received from federal government void). Four Justices dissented from the invalidation of the sales tax in Panhandle, two of them joining Holmes's convincing argument that the
decision was inconsistent with Metcalf& Eddy, which had allowed a tax on income from a government contract: In either case there was a chance that the tax might increase the price of government
procurement. It was in this dissent that Holmes strongly questioned McCulloch's premise that governments were implicitly immune from nondiscriminatory taxes: "The power to tax is not the power
to destroy while this Court sits." Panhandle,277 U.S. at 223 (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis and
Stone, JJ., dissenting). The fourth dissenter was McReynolds. Id. at 225. Holmes's dissent in Long,
analogizing a patent to a grant of federal land, was joined by Brandeis, Stone, and Sutherland. Long,
277 U.S. at 148-51. Stone, Holmes, and Brandeis also dissented in McCallen, 279 U.S. at 634-38.
For a perceptive contemporaneous discussion, see Cohen & Dayton, FederalTaxation ofState Activities and State Taxation ofFederalActivities,34 YALE L.J. 807 (1925) (urging that government itself
should be immune even in proprietary capacity but that nondiscriminatory taxes on government
contractors should generally be allowed).
248. 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918); see White, supra note 20, at 1121-23.
249. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 44 (1922) (the Child Labor Tax Case).
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employed, Taft argued that "a court must be blind not to see that the socalled tax is imposed to stop the employment of children" and quoted
Marshall's famous condemnation of measures adopted by Congress
"under the pretext of executing its powers" but "for the accomplishment
of objects not intrusted to the [federal] government. ' 25 0 "Grant the validity of this law," he concluded,
and all that Congress would need to do, hereafter, in seeking to take
over to its control any one of the great number of subjects of public
interest, jurisdiction of which the States have never parted with, and
which are reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to
enact a detailed measure of complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a so-called tax upon departures from it. To give such magic
to the word "tax" would be to break down all constitutional limitation
of the powers
of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of
251
the States.
Amen, Chief Justice Taft. Not even Holmes and Brandeis, dissenters in Hammer, took issue with this powerful reasoning. 252 They did not
explain why they thought the two cases different. Nevertheless, the cases
can respectably be distinguished: Because it is not limited to activities
affecting interstate or foreign commerce, the tax power is a greater threat
to the notion of a limited central government than is the commerce
clause.25 3 The odd thing was that in the past the Court had seemed to
view the matter in precisely the opposite way: Hammer v. Dagenhart
appeared to subject commerce clause measures to stricter scrutiny than
the Court had ever employed in tax cases. 254 Working his way unconvincingly around precedents that had been indifferent to the dangers of
pretextual taxes,2 55 Taft seemed to mean that for only the second time in
250.
251.
striking
252.

Id. at 37, 40 (quoting MeCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819)).
Id. at 36-40; see also Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1922) (Taft, C.J.) (unanimously
down a federal tax on grain future transactions not complying with detailed provisions).
Justice Clarke, also a Hammer dissenter, dissented from the tax decision alone and withbut

opinion. The Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 44.
253. See Powell, Child Labor, Congress, and the Constitution, 1 N.C.L. REV.61 (1922) (approving the Holmes-Brandeis position in both cases); Sutherland, The Child Labor Cases and the Constitution, 8 CORNELL L.Q. 338 (1923) (same).

254. See Fuller I,supra note 20, at 357-69 (discussing the Court's interpretation of the commerce clause in years 1889-1910); White, supra note 20, at 1121-23 (discussing Hammer).
255. The Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 40-43. Taft rightly explained that an alternative
ground for upholding the prohibitive tax on state bank notes in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 533 (1869), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 319, had been that Congress could have
accomplished the same goal by regulation. The Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 41-42. He
distinguished McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904), on the feeble ground that the law imposing a prohibitive tax on oleomargarine did not "show on its face as does the law before us the
detailed specifications of a regulation of a state concern and business." The Child Labor Tax Case,
259 U.S. at 42. Taft concluded that United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919), had upheld the
imposition of detailed regulatory requirements on the sale of narcotic drugs on the ground that they
had "a reasonable relation to the enforcement of" a nominal tax. The Child Labor Tax Case, 259
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twenty years the Court was prepared to take seriously the framers' clear
instruction that the national government was to have only limited
powers.

256

2. Commerce. Even as it recognized that federal taxes had to be
scrutinized in order to defend the principle of limited central government, the Court continued to construe rather broadly Congress's authority to regulate commerce among the several states. In 1922, for example,
in opinions by the Chief Justice, the Court reaffirmed Congress's power
to regulate both stockyard sales of cattle between legs of an interstate
journey, and intrastate rates that had harmful effects on interstate commerce. 257 In the same year, it is true, the Court held that Congress could
U.S. at 43. Despite dictum by McReynolds in United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 362-63
(1926), questioning the vitality of Doremus, it was reaffirmed over dissents by McReynolds and
Sutherland, see Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 351-54 (1928) (Taft, C.J.) (adding that intervening amendments had rendered the revenue collected by the tax substantial), McReynolds himself
wrote to uphold a stamp tax on morphine and cocaine sales. Alston v. United States, 274 U.S, 289,
294 (1927) (contested provisions "do not absolutely prohibit buying and selling; have produced substantial revenue; contain nothing to indicate that by colorable use of taxation Congress is attempting
to invade the reserved powers of the States").
256. Determining where to draw the line promised to be a formidable task. Inquiry into legislative motive, as Marshall had long ago warned, was a ticklish affair. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810), discussedin D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 128-29. Moreover, the Court rightly
acknowledged in the Child Labor Tax Case that an "incidental motive" of discouraging undesirable
activities was consistent with the legitimate exercise of federal tax power. The Child Labor Tax
Case, 259 U.S. at 38. As the taxpayer had conceded, "Congress could not possibly levy internal
excise taxes . . . without some incidental interference with the conduct of citizens in those fields
which are directly regulatable only by the States." Id. at 31. Cf. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928) (Taft, C.J.) (unanimously upholding a protective tariff on the basis
of long history: "So long as the motive of Congress and the effect of its legislative action are to
secure revenue for the benefit of the general government, the existence of other motives in the selection of the subjects of taxes can not invalidate Congressional action."); Alston v. United States, 274
U.S. 289, 294 (1927) (discussed supra note 255). Taft might have added that, as in the Veazie Bank
case, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 541-42 (1869), discussed supra note 255, the tariff could not be considered a means to an illegitimate end, because Congress could have accomplished its protective goal by
direct regulation under the commerce clause. The Court's insistence that the tax serve a legitimate
revenue purpose found substantial analogical support in Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347
(1915), discussed in White, supra note 20, at 1134, which had invalidated a grandfather clause for
voting under the fifteenth amendment because it served no conceivable purpose other than the forbidden one of racial discrimination. See also Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867)
(holding a test oath punitive for ex post facto purposes because no legitimate reason appeared for
disqualifying former Confederate sympathizers from ministry), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note
20, at 292-93.
257. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); Wisconsin R.R. Comm'n v. Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 585-86 (1922); see also Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420
(1930) (Brandeis, J.) (regulation of stockyard brokers dealing with livestock traveling interstate);
United States v. New York Cent. R.R., 272 U.S. 457, 464 (1926) (Stone, J.) (regulation of local
traffic using interstate terminal); Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 (1926) (Brandeis, J.) (abandonment of local rail line whose unprofitability endangered interstate operations); ef Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), discussed in Fuller I, supra note 20, at 352-53; Houston, E. &
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not regulate all grain futures transactions 25- and that the Sherman Act
applied neither to professional baseball 259 nor to a mine strike.260 But
the first of these decisions had been influenced by Congress's failure to
limit its rules to transactions affecting interstate or foreign commerce and
the last by lack of evidence of an intention to disrupt commerce. 61
When these deficiencies were remedied, the Court sustained the applica262
tion of federal law.
Most striking in its contrast both with the Child Labor Tax Case
and with Hammer v. Dagenhart,however, was the unanimous 1925 decision in Brooks v. United States, upholding a federal statute forbidding
interstate transportation of stolen cars.2 63 Earlier cases had established,
wrote the Chief Justice, that Congress could indeed exercise "the police
power ... within the field of interstate commerce" to prevent "the use of
such commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the
spread of any evil or harm to the people of other States from the State of
origin. ' '264 Interstate commerce facilitated theft by "help[ing] to conceal
the trail of the thieves," and that was enough: "Congress may properly
punish such interstate transportation ... because of its harmful result
and its defeat of the property rights of those whose machines against
265
their will are taken into other jurisdictions."
Before Hammer v. Dagenhart,all this would have been very plausible; and the Child Labor Tax Case could have been distinguished (instead
of ignored) on the ground that the commerce power, unlike the power to
tax, could safely be exercised solely for police power ends. But Hammer
had limited the use of the commerce clause for police purposes, distinguishing prior decisions on the ground that goods made by child labor,
unlike lottery tickets or adulterated food, were "harmless"; Congress
could not forbid interstate transportation simply to discourage the per2 66
ceived evil of child labor.
Recognizing this distinction, Taft proceeded to misapply it, arguing
only that interstate transportation encouraged auto theft-the very arguW.T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (the Shreveport Rate Case), discussedin White, supra

note 20, at 1118-21.
258. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) (Taft, C.J.).
259. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
260. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 407-13 (1922) (Taft, C.J.).
261. Id.; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68 (1922).
262. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1925) (Taft, C.J); Board of
Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 32-36 (1923) (Taft, C.J., over dissents by McReynolds and Sutherland)
(relying on "current of commerce" theory of Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922)).
263. 267 U.S. 432 (1925) (Taft, C.J.).
264. Id. at 436-37.
265. Id. at 438-39.
266. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271-72.
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ment that he acknowledged had been held insufficient in Hammer.267 He
made no effort to show that stolen cars were harmful to anyone in the
state to which they were transported. 2 6 He thus left Hammer dangling
without visible support and exposed the Court to a serious charge of
inconsistency.
Nevertheless, there may be more to Brooks than a mere judicial belief that car theft is worse than child labor. In upholding a federal ban on
interstate transportation of lottery tickets, the Court had noted that Congress had merely "supplemented" state lottery laws by making clear
"that it would not permit the declared policy of the States . . . to be
overthrown or disregarded by the agency of interstate commerce. ' 269 In
Hammer it had insisted that the commerce power could not be used "to
control the States in their exercise of the police power over local trade
and manufacture. '2 70 In Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway, 27 1 on which Brooks relied, the Court had upheld a federal statute
forbidding the transportation of liquor into a state in which its use was
prohibited. 272 The pattern seems clear: It is easier to sustain a federal
police measure that reinforces state policy than one that contradicts it.
And the federal stolen car law, unlike the child labor law, was in aid of
2 73
state policy.
That congruence with state policy makes a regulation any more one
of interstate commerce in the textual sense is a little difficult to swallow.
To the extent that the Hammer limitation reflects the need to prevent use
of the commerce power to undermine state autonomy, however, the distinction makes perfect sense. Taft did not put it in these terms, but the
result he reached in Brooks followed logically from the premises that had
underlain both of the Court's child labor decisions.
3. Prohibition. The eighteenth amendment, which took effect in
1920, forbade "the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating
267. Brooks, 267 U.S. at 438.
268. See id. at 438-39. He might have argued, perhaps, that buyers in the receiving state would
be injured by the possibility of having to return the vehicles to their rightful owners without compensation, but he did not.
269. Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903).
270. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273-74.
271. 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
272. See White, supra note 20, at 1121 n.55.
273. For early arguments based on this distinction, see Bruce, Interstate Commerce and ChildLabor, 3 MINN. L. REv. 89, 99-100 (1919); Cushman, The NationalPolice Power Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 3 MINN. L. REv.289, 300-08 (1919). The child-labor law, as the
Court in Hammer noted, had been defended on the ground that the law made it possible for some
states to pursue policies against child labor by protecting themselves from outside competition; but it
did so by undermining the contrary policy of other states. See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273.
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liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof
from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof
for beverage purposes." Its second section gave "Congress and the several States ... concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.127 4 As already noted, this "noble experiment" gave rise to a
number of interesting search and seizure questions that the Court uniformly resolved in favor of law enforcement. 27 5 It also produced a spate
of decisions on more substantive issues, several of which were of lasting
significance for their implications as to the interpretation of other grants
of congressional power.
Except in two commerce clause decisions near the end of the nineteenth century, 276 the Supreme Court had always displayed a tolerant
attitude toward efforts to limit the availability of alcoholic beverages. It
had upheld state power to outlaw liquor manufacture even for the
maker's own use or for shipment outside the state.2 77 Even after overruling its earlier conclusion that the commerce clause allowed the states to
forbid sales of out-of-state liquor in the original package,2 78 the Court
had permitted Congress both to remove the commerce clause barrier to
state legislation and to make importation into a dry state a federal
crime. 279 And it had upheld a general federal prohibition law on the
rather strained ground that it promoted the waging of a war whose fighting had already ended. 280 When the nation decided that previous measures were inadequate and that the Constitution itself should, for only the
274. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed by amend. XXI in 1933). The third section, the
constitutionality of which the Court upheld, see infra note 283, required that ratification take place
within seven years.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 187-234.
276. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 118 (1890) (overruling The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
504 (1847), which upheld state laws prohibiting sales of out-of-state liquor sold in original package);
Bowman v. Chicago & N. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 500 (1888) (state may not bar importation).
277. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western M. Ry., 242 U.S. 311,.322 (1917) (sustaining state law that
forbade shipment or transportation of intoxicating liquor for personal use under Webb-Kenyon
Act); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1888) (state may prohibit manufacturing of liquor intended for export); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661-63 (1887) (state prohibition of manufacture
of liquor does not infringe any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution);
Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 133 (1847) (usual and ordinary state legislation regulating or prohibiting sale of liquor raises no constitutional issue).
278. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 118 (1890) (overruling The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
504 (1847)).
279. United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 425 (1919) (Congress may forbid interstate transportation of liquor without reference to the policy or law of any state); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 564
(1891) (sustaining federal act providing that imported liquor should be subject to state laws as if the
liquor had been produced in the state itself).
280. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 163 (1919) (War-Time
Prohibition Act valid exercise of Congress's war power despite changed circumstances); see also
Jacob Ruppert Corp. v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 301 (1920) (War-Time Prohibition Act within war
power of Congress).
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second time, outlaw private conduct, 281 the Court not only remained tolerant; it seemed to become an enthusiastic partisan.

Immediately before Taft was appointed, the Court in the National
ProhibitionCases had rejected arguments that the eighteenth amendment
exceeded the amending power reserved by article V and that the refer-

ence to "concurrent power" required joint state and federal action for the
adoption of enforcing legislation. 2 82 Oddly, the Court pointedly an-

nounced only its "conclusions," without professing to supply any supporting reasons. Chief Justice White, who concurred, justly protested
and gave a reason of his own for the Court's conclusion: To require joint
action would be incompatible with the apparent purpose of providing for
2 83
effective enforcement.
281. The only precedent was the thirteenth amendment's ban on slavery.
282. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386-87 (1920) (Van Devanter, 1.). Consideration
of the explicit limitations on the amending power contained in article V ought to have squelched the
argument that the general authority to amend did not mean what it said (despite the clever analogy
to implicit sovereignty limits on the tax power drawn by counsel in Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130,
132 (1922)). The Convention itself had rejected the argument that its authority to propose amendments to the Articles of Confederation was implicitly limited to minor changes. Compare I THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 249 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter
cited as M. FARRAND] (Lansing argued that "the power of the Convention was restrained to amendments of a federal nature, and having for their basis the Confederacy in being"), with id. at 262
(Randolph responded that "the whole of the confederation upon revision is subject to amendment
and alteration") (emphasis in original), and THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 258-67 (J. Madison) (.
Cooke ed. 1961). See also Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922) (Brandeis, J.)(rejecting argument that nineteenth amendment exceeded amending power because admitting women to electorate
destroyed states' political autonomy; the analogous fifteenth amendment, which had extended vote
to blacks, had been accepted as valid for half a century). Leser added that state constitutions could
not limit the ratification authority given state legislatures by article V and refused to look behind
official certifications to determine whether ratification had been accomplished in accordance with
state legislative procedures, id. at 137. For a sampling of arguments for implicit limitations on the
amending power, see generally Abbot, Inalienable Rights and the Eighteenth Amendment, 20
COLUM. L. REV. 183 (1920); Marbury, Limits upon the Amendment Power, 33 HARV. L. REV. 223
(1919); Skinner, IntrinsicLimits on the Power of ConstitutionalAmendment, 18 MICH. L. REV. 213
(1920); White, Is There an Eighteenth Amendment? 5 CORNELL L.Q. 113 (1920). For a response,
see Frierson, Amending the Constitution of the United States, 33 HARV. L. REV. 659 (1920).
283. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. at 388-92. Not only would it have been bizarre to
find that an amendment designed to eliminate alcoholic beverages had actually weakened the preexisting authority of state and federal governments independently to outlaw liquor within their respective spheres, but in neither legislative nor judicial contexts had "concurrent" traditionally meant
(as McKenna and Clarke urged in dissent) "joint." Commerce clause decisions finding concurrent
state power had upheld the authority of a state to act on its own, see Needham, The Exclusive Power
of Congress over Interstate Commerce, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 251, 256-57 (1911), and the notion that
two courts would share jurisdiction over the same case is little short of absurd. The Court's construction does not deprive the mention of state authority of all force; the "concurrent" power provision both precludes any implication of exclusive federal power and expands state authority over
interstate and international transactions. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 381 (1922) (Taft,
C.J.). Nevertheless, there were respectable arguments for a surprising variety of alternative interpretations. See, eg., Cushing, "ConcurrentPower" in the Eighteenth Amendment, 8 CALIF. L. REV.
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This conclusion effectively determined the result of the Taft Court's
first encounter with Prohibition: Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania held that a
state prohibition law survived the adoption of the amendment. 2 4 The
decision in United States v. Lanza that prosecution under a state liquor

law did not bar a federal prosecution for the same act was no more surprising, because it had long been established that double jeopardy meant
285
two prosecutions by the same sovereign.
More controversial were the split decisions in Grogan v. Hiram
Walker & Sons, Ltd.28 6 and Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon2 87 that the
amendment's unqualified prohibitions of "transportation" and "importation" applied to sealed shipments across the United States and to sealed

supplies on board domestic and foreign ships in United States waters.
Brushing aside the dissenters' precedents as inapposite, Holmes persuasively explained in Grogan that the amendment's ban on exportation of
liquor suggested both a concern that liquor in transit might be deflected
to local use and a desire to keep the country entirely out of the liquor
business. 2 88 In Cunard,Van DeVanter, by employing similar arguments
205 (1920); Dowling, Concurrent Power Under the Eighteenth Amendment, 6 MINN. L. REv. 447
(1922).
Before Taft's appointment, the prohibition amendment had given rise to two other interesting
issues of amendment procedure. See Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 373, 375 (1921) (Van Devanter,
J.) (upholding Congress's power to require ratification within seven years, finding in article V both
an intention "to invest Congress with a wide range of power in proposing amendments" and "a fair
implication that [ratification] must be sufficiently contemporaneous. . . to reflect the will of the
people in all sections at relatively the same period"); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 230 (1920)
(Day, J.) (holding that article V's provision for ratification by state "legislatures" precluded states
from imposing additional referendum requirement). Since the eighteenth amendment had been ratified within the specified period, it was not clear that there was an actual controversy over the validity
of the time limit. See Dillon, 256 U.S. at 369 (appellant argued that time limit "tended to destroy
any deliberation" on amendment). For a good contemporaneous discussion of these issues, see
Dodd, Amending the FederalConstitution, 30 YALE L.J. 321 (1921).
284. 258 U.S. 403, 409 (1922) (Brandeis, J.). Day and McReynolds dissented without opinion.

Id.
285. 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (Taft, C.J.) (citing, for example, Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
410 (1847)). In Taft's view, state authority to combat liquor was not derived from the amendment,
which merely "put an end to restrictions upon the State's power arising from the Federal Constitution." Lanza, 260 U.S. at 381. He added a strong reason for the narrow interpretation of double
jeopardy:
If a State were to punish the manufacture, transportation and sale of intoxicating liquor by
small or nominal fines, the race of offenders to the courts of that State to plead guilty and
secure immunity from federal prosecution for such acts would not make for respect for the
federal statute or for its deterrent effect.
Id. at 385.
286. 259 U.S. 80 (1922).
287. 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
288. Grogan, 259 U.S. at 80-90. United States v. Gudger, 249 U.S. 373, 375 (1919), had held
shipment across a state not to be transportation "into any State or Territory" within the meaning of
an earlier statute, but the eighteenth amendment used the broader term "transportation. . . within
. . . the United States." Cases giving a narrow interpretation to terms like "importation" for tariff
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as well as invoking Grogan, answered the respectable argument that pro-

visions should be presumed not to infringe international law by citing
precedents that narrowly defined the traditional immunity of foreign ves2 89
sels in American harbors.

Most significant for future constitutional litigation, however, were
three decisions of the Taft period giving a broad construction to Con-

gress's authority under section 2 of the amendment "to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." In 1924, without dissent, Justice Sanford
wrote in James Everard's Breweries v. Day290 to uphold congressional

authority to forbid the sale of malt liquors for medicinal purposes. The
significant objection was that, like the fourteenth amendment, the eighteenth amendment gave Congress the power only to enforce its own provisions, and the amendment did not outlaw sales for medicinal use.
There were precedents that might appear to support this argument.
The enforcement provisions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments,

for instance, had rightly been held to authorize Congress to prohibit
neither private racial discrimination nor the denial of the right to vote on

grounds unrelated to race. As Justice Bradley had said in the Civil
purposes, eg., The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 115 (1897), can be distinguished as based upon the
distinct purposes of the tax laws. The argument for construing the amendment narrowly to avoid
conflict with an earlier treaty was rejected by Holmes as a "makeweight[ ]" argument, insufficient to
withstand the language and purpose of the new provision. Grogan, 259 U.S. at 88-89 ("The Eighteenth Amendment meant a great revolution in the policy of this country, and presumably and obviously meant to upset a good many things on as well as off the statute book,"). That the treaty really
authorized what the amendment forbade was not even clear: In allowing the passage of goods
through the country without payment of tariffs, it arguably gave only an exemption from the tax
laws.
289. Cunard, 262 U.S. at 124-25 (citing The Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 144 (1812)
(holding a foreign warship immune from judicial process, but noting that merchant vessels would
not be immune), and Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 11 (1887) (upholding punishment of a foreign
seaman under American law for killing another foreigner on a foreign ship in American waters)).
See also id. at 132-33 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). The respectability of Sutherland's premise-that
longstanding traditions should be presumed not to have been overthrown-is confirmed by such
cases as Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (article III grant ofjudicial power implicitly subject to
sovereign immunity), discussed in Fuller I, supra note 20, at 327-30; Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (II
Wall.) 113 (1871) (state judge's salary implicitly immune from federal taxation), discussed in D.
CURRIF, supra note 20, at 393 n.172. But cf Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (Congress not limited by sovereign immunity in legislating to enforce fourteenth amendment), Because
the Court's precedents had shown that application of the amendment to foreign ships was consistent
with the traditional rule that purely internal matters were governed by the law of the flag, its decision that the amendment applied to foreign ships in this country did not depend upon the further
conclusion that the amendment's reference to "the United States and all territory subject to the
jurisdiction thereof" displaced the traditional rule. It was the latter conclusion that led the Court to
hold that the amendment did not apply to American ships on the high seas, Cunard, 262 U.S. at
123-24, which arguably were of greater concern to American policy than were foreign ships in New
York harbor. Cf Currie,Flagsof Convenience,American Labor,and the Conflict ofLaws, 1963 Sup.
Cr. REV. 34.
290. 265 U.S. 545 (1924).
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Rights Cases, the fourteenth amendment limited only "state" action, and

Congress's sole authority was "to adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited State laws and State acts." 2'9
Echoing McCulloch v. Maryland's292 broad test for determining
whether a measure was "necessary and proper" to the exercise of specific
federal powers, Justice Sanford found the prohibition of medicinal beer
an appropriate means of preventing beverage use:
The opportunity to manufacture, sell and prescribe intoxicating malt
liquors for "medicinal purposes," opens many doors to clandestine
traffic in them as beverages under the guise of medicines; facilitates
many frauds, subterfuges and artifices; aids evasion: and, thereby and
to that extent, hampers
and obstructs the enforcement of the Eight2 93
eenth Amendment.
Though Sanford did not say so, this passage served both to distinguish
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendment cases, where the invalidated
measures had not served to prevent evasion of the constitutional mandate, 294 and to make analogous the many decisions allowing Congress to
regulate matters that were not themselves interstate commerce in order
to further the constitutional purpose of keeping that commerce free.2 95

He added that the measure could not be said to be arbitrary, in view of
the lack of evidence that malt liquor had any significant medicinal
value.

296

This decision seemed to make obvious the later holdings that Congress could both regulate the sale of denatured alcohol 297 and limit the
291. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). See also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S.

629 (1883) (invalidating federal law forbidding private denial of equal protection); United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (striking down voting rights law as overbroad). See generally D. CURRIE,
supra note 20, at 393-402.
292. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
293. Day, 265 U.S. at 561.
294. Cf Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding prohibition of English literacy
test for voting, in part because of risk that such a requirement might be a cover for racial discrimination); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (allowing federal punishment of private persons
"jointly engaged" with state officers in killing civil rights workers without due process). The passage
in Day also served to show, in contrast to the Child Labor Tax Case, discussed supra text accompanying notes 248-56, that this prohibition was not a pretext for regulating the practice of medicine.
295. E.g., Houston, E. & W.T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (the Shreveport Rate
Case), discussedin White, supra note 20, at 1118-21. Along the same lines was the conclusion of an
undivided Court in United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927) (Holmes, J.)
("Congress may
prohibit the [setting of fires] upon privately owned lands that imperil the publicly owned forests,"
apparently under its article IV authority to make "Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States," U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2).
296. Day, 265 U.S. at 561-62.
297. Selzman v. United States, 268 U.S. 466, 469 (1925) (Taft, C.J.) ("It helps the main purpose
of the Amendment. . .to hedge about the making and disposition of the denatured article every
reasonable precaution and penalty to prevent the proper industrial use of it from being perverted to
drinking it.").
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amounts of wine and whiskey that doctors could prescribe. 298 Interest-

ingly, however, four Justices dissented in the latter case, distinguishing
Day on the ground that whiskey and wine, unlike beer, had real medici-

nal value. 299 Sanford had indeed mentioned the lack of medicinal value
in the earlier case, but that other liquors had such value did not reduce
the need to control them in order to avoid frustration of federal policy;
no one had denied that the denatured alcohol Congress had unanimously
been allowed to regulate had legitimate industrial uses. 300

I am inclined to think that all the Prohibition decisions discussed in
this section were rightly decided. In particular, the decisions respecting

congressional power seem to have been substantially in accord with
analogous commerce clause doctrine. It remains striking, however, that

under the influence of the popular uprising that culminated in the adoption of the amendment, a Court so strict in its scrutiny of legislative
means under the innocuous-looking due process clauses 30 1 would assume
such a relaxed attitude in determining the appropriateness of means to

achieve limited congressional goals-especially since nothing in the opinions suggested that the Court's principles of broad construction applied
30 2
only to Prohibition cases.

298. Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 589 (1926) (Brandeis, J.) ("That the limitation upon
the amount of liquor which may be prescribed for medicinal purposes, is a provision adapted to
promote the purpose of the amendment is clear.").
299. Id. at 600-02 (Sutherland, J., dissenting, joined by McReynolds, Butler, and Stone, JJ.).
300. Sutherland attempted to distinguish between regulation and prohibition of intoxicants, id.
at 604-05 (Sutherland, J., dissenting), but the distinction seems at best a poor substitute for the
argument, rejected in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315, 413-15 (1819), that Congress
must use the least restrictive means. Moreover, it was not clear that Sutherland applied his own
distinction correctly, for Congress had merely limited the amount that could be prescribed, not
prohibited it altogether. Cf. Fuller I, supra note 20, at 354-56 (discussing The Lottery Case, 188
U.S. 321 (1903)). Hammer's notion that the tenth amendment somehow limited the powers granted
to Congress, echoes of which appear in the Lambert dissent, had been flatly rejected in Day: "(I]f
the act is within the power confided to Congress, the Tenth Amendment, by its very terms, has no
application, since it only reserves to the States 'powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution.'" James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 558 (1924).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 40-80.
302. For the most part, the opponents of broad construction of the eighteenth amendment were
the traditional enemies of government regulation: Sutherland, MeReynolds, and Butler. They were
joined in dissent in the medicinal wine case, however, by Stone, who, though normally tolerant of
legislative intervention, was said to have been a collector of fine wines. See A. MASON, HARLAN
FISKE STONE, supra note 2, at 726-33. Less out of line, perhaps, was the presence of Justice Van
Devanter among those voting to uphold federal authority. Though a stubborn advocate of substantive due process, he had written some of the Court's broadest commerce clause decisions in his first
days on the Court. See White, supra note 20, at 1118-21. Whether either the latter cases or his
Prohibition record were consistent with his opinions during the later New Deal days is a matter best
discussed in a later part of this study.
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A.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

The Courts.

1. Cases and Controversies. Ever since the beginning, the
Supreme Court had appeared to treat article III's vesting of "judicial"
power to decide enumerated categories of "cases" and "controversies" in
the federal courts as implicitly forbidding them to engage in other governmental functions 0 3 This conclusion had been resoundingly confirmed in 1913 in Muskrat v. United States. There, on a variety of
unpersuasive grounds, the Court had struck down a statute authorizing
suit to determine the constitutionality of a law as providing in essence for
an advisory opinion. 30 The Taft period afforded the Court several opportunities to expand on the definition of a case or controversy.
a. Parties and ripeness. One aspect of the case-or-controversy
limitation on which the Court had relied in Muskrat was the elementary
requirement that there be two adverse parties-in order, among other
things, to help ensure that both sides of the argument may be vigorously
presented in the interest of a sound decision. 30 5 In Muskrat, the Court
concluded that the United States, though expressly made a defendant by
statute, was not a proper one because it had no interest adverse to that of
the plaintiffs. In Tutun v. United States,30 6 on the other hand, the Court
in 1926 suggested that the United States might be a proper defendant in a
proceeding to which it had never been made a party.
The question in Tutun was whether a person seeking American citizenship could appeal the denial of his petition to a circuit court of appeals. 30 7 The answer depended upon finding that the naturalization
proceeding was a "case" within the meaning of the appeal statute; and
that, Justice Brandeis concluded, turned on whether it was a "case" or
"controversy" in the constitutional sense.30 8
Practice, as Brandeis noted, yielded an affirmative answer: The federal courts had been passing upon naturalization petitions without objec303. See, eg., Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 409, 410-14 (1792). See generally D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 6-13; Correspondence of the
Justices, reprinted in H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 146, at 64-66.
304. 219 U.S. 346, 361-63 (1911). See White, supra note 20, at 1113-17 (discussing Muskrat).
305. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 361; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) ("Have the
appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing.").
306. 270 U.S. 568 (1926).
307. Id. at 574.
308. Id. at 576.
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tion since 1790.309 The difficulty, however, was that naturalization was
normally an ex parte proceeding. The applicant presented a petition, the
court listened to his evidence, and it issued or denied a certificate. There
was no requirement that anyone be named as a defendant or appear in
3 10
opposition.
Justice Brandeis, pointing to a statutory provision permitting the
United States to be heard in opposition to any naturalization petition,
responded that "[ihe United States is always a possible adverse
party. '31 1 He did not say that the United States had opposed the petition
in Tutun, and he carefully refrained from limiting his decision to cases in
which it had. He appeared to conclude that it was enough that the Government might oppose a petition if it chose to.
If the United States actually opposes a particular naturalization
claim, as it did in Tutun, 312 a controversy arises. It is difficult, however,
to see how there can be any controversy until it does so. Only two years
later the same Justice was to write for the Court in denying that a suit to
remove a cloud from title presented a controversy because the allegedly
adverse parties had not disputed the rights of the plaintiffs: "No defendant has wronged the plaintiff or has threatened to do S0."1313 He did not
314
explain how this conclusion could be reconciled with Tutun.
In both Muskrat and Tutun, the arguably missing party had been
16
the defendant; in Fairchildv. Hughes3 15 and Frothinghamv. Mellon, 3 it
309. Id.
310. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 11, 34 Stat. 596, 599.
311. Tutun, 270 U.S. at 577 (citing Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 11, 34 Stat. 596, 599).
312. See Brief for Petitioner at 1, 5, Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926).
313. Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274, 288, 290 (1928) (Brandeis, J.); see also
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 76 (1927) (Sanford, J.) (holding that a federal court
had no jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgment). Indeed, along with Justice McReynolds, Brandeis was one of the Court's most vigorous exponents of the principle forbidding decision of unripe
disputes. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 603-23 (1923) (McReynolds, J., and
Brandeis, J., dissenting in separate opinions); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 224 (McReynolds
and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting) (1923). In both cases, Brandeis and McReynolds dissented from decisions finding suits to enjoin the enforcement of state laws ripe. In Terrace, the remaining Justices
concluded with much force that the threat to enforce a criminal statute against the plaintiffs created
a traditional equitable controversy: "They are not obliged to take the risk of prosecution, fines and
imprisonment and loss of property in order to secure an adjudication of their rights." Terrace, 263
U.S. at 216.
314. Nor did he draw the arguable conclusion that the long tradition ofjudicial naturalization
proceedings showed that Muskrat had been wrong in holding adverse parties a requisite of a "case"
or "controversy." Cf Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHi. L. REv. 601, 607 (1968)
("From the beginning, federal courts have performed many functions in addition to deciding 'questions presented in an adversary context.' Federal courts often decide questions of law and fact and
discretion in absence of an adversary context, as they do when they. . .admit aliens to citizenship
when no issue arises. .. ").
315. 258 U.S. 126 (1922).
316. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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was the plaintiff. In Fairchild,Justice Brandeis rejected an ordinary citizen's challenge to the constitutionality of the procedure by which the
nineteenth amendment was being ratified. The argument that a proclamation of the amendment's ratification would lead to invalid elections,
said the Court, was not for the plaintiff to make:
Plaintiff has only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that
the Government be administered according to law and that the public
moneys be not wasted. Obviously this general right does not entitle a
private citizen to institute in the federal courts a suit to secure by indirection a determination whether
...a constitutional amendment about
3 17
to be adopted, will be valid.
In the second case, Justice Sutherland wrote to hold that neither a federal taxpayer nor a state had standing to challenge a federal law providing for grants to promote maternal health: The state could neither sue in
its sovereign capacity nor represent its citizens' interests against the
United States, while the taxpayer's interest "is shared with millions of
others; [it] is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect
upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity. 3 1 s
The notion that a plaintiff could sue only to redress an injury of his
own was by no means new. 319 What may have been new, despite the

quoted reference in Frothinghamto "the preventive powers of a court of
equity," was the attribution of this rule to the case-or-controversy requirement of article III. Justice Brandeis was unequivocal in Fairchild:
"In form [this proceeding] is a bill in equity; but it is not a case within
the meaning of § 2 of Article III of the Constitution. . . ,,320 In Frothingham, too, the Court explicitly invoked article III in holding that the
state could not sue, and it ended its opinion with a passage that seemed
to say that the Constitution controlled the taxpayer's suit as well: Because "the parties plaintiff" had not alleged "direct injury as the result of
...enforcement" of the challenged measure, to grant them relief "would
be not to decide a judicial controversy but to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, an
authority which plainly we do not possess. ' 321
317. Fairchild,258 U.S. at 129-30. Since the plaintiff resided in a state whose constitution already provided for women's suffrage, and since presidential voting is conducted on a state-by-state
basis, it would have been hard for him to argue that the amendment would dilute his voting power.
See id. at 129.
318. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.
319. See, eg., Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348 (1809).
320. Fairchild,258 U.S. at 129.
321. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 480-85, 488-89.
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That article III should require an interested plaintiff follows from
the same considerations of optimal decisionmaking that require an interested defendant. Justice Sutherland's closing comment, moreover, suggested that the standing limitation implicated separation-of-powers
concerns as well. "We have no power per se," he had said earlier in the
same opinion, "to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that
they are unconstitutional. '322 Judicial review was only the power "of
ascertaining and declaring the law applicable to the controversy. It
amounts to little more than the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment, which otherwise would stand in the way of the en' 323
forcement of a legal right.
It seems clear enough that the case-or-controversy limitation has
something to do with separation of powers, and that it serves, among
other things, to avoid the decision of unnecessary constitutional questions. It is also true that in describing judicial review as merely the inevitable consequence of deciding cases and controversies, Sutherland was
echoing something that Marshall had said in justifying the doctrine in
Marbury v. Madison.324 Sutherland exhibited no awareness, however, of
Marbury's equally prominent insistence that judicial review had to be
inferred in order that constitutional limitations on Congress be respected:
Judicial review was no mere incident but an essential element in a system
325
of checks and balances.
In this light, far from reinforcing the result in Frothingham,Marbury gives rise to an argument that the case was wrongly decided: If no
one has standing to challenge a federal spending program, there is no
way to prevent unconstitutional spending. Of course, this argument cannot justify judicial action in the absence of the case or controversy the
Constitution requires, but it may help in determining just what a case or
326
controversy is.
322. Id. at 488.
323. Id.
324. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) ("Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must

of necessity expound and interpret the rule. .

.

. So, if a law be in opposition to the constitution;

. . .the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. ....).

325. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178 (to require the courts to "close their eyes on the constitution. . . would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same breath
which professes to restrict those powers within narrow limits"). See D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at
66-74 (discussing Marbury).
326. See J. PASCHAL, supra note 2, at 149. "[P]erhaps no other single decision in the Court's
history has been fraught with such destructive implications for the idea of limited government," id.,
an idea for which Sutherland fought continually in his opinions on the merits. Compare the question
whether the critical function of judicial review places implicit limits on Congress's express article III
authority to make "exceptions" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See D. CURRIE, supra
note 20, at 304-07 (discussing Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869)).
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That a state could not sue to protect merely sovereign interests was
not at all obvious. Not only would such a proceeding assure judicial
review of actions that might otherwise go unreviewed, but the state seems

a logical defender of the position that state rights have been invaded by
federal legislation-and that was the claim in Frothingham. Unfortunately for Massachusetts, however, the lack of standing on this basis had

been established in two major nineteenth-century decisions; despite the
striking contrast of an intervening Holmes opinion, 3 27 it was not surpris328
ing that the Court elected to follow them.

The Court's argument with respect to the state's representative

claim was shakier. Although the state had been permitted to speak for
its citizens in suing other states, said Sutherland, "it is no part of its duty
or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations with the Federal Government. In that field it is the United States, and not the State,
which represents them as parenspatriae ....-329 Neither authority nor

argument was offered to support this conclusion, and it seems no less
appropriate for the state to represent its citizens against the United States

than against anyone else.

Nevertheless, Sutherland seems to have

reached the right result, even if on the wrong ground: Since the state's

alleged right to sue was based upon representation of its citizens, it could
sue only to enforce their rights, and no one had identified any citizen
whose rights the federal law infringed.

Most interesting and influential was the final conclusion that Frothingham, the taxpayer, also lacked standing to sue. Her argument was
327. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
328. See Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868), cited in Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 48384; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); see also D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 122-26,
302-04; accord, New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328 (1926) (Van Devanter, J.). Shortly before
Frothingham,however, in upholding the standing of a state to challenge a federal treaty, the Court
had declined to rest its decision solely upon the Government's concession that the state had standing
as owner of the migratory birds affected by the treaty. Rather, the Court had emphasized that "it is
enough that the bill is a reasonable and proper means to assert the alleged quasi-sovereign rights of a
State." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920). See Corwin, ConstitutionalLaw in 19191920, 15 AM. POL. SC. REV. 52, 54-55 n.52 (1921) (arguing that this decision seemed to undermine
Stanton). The references to "political" questions in Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 484-85, like those in
Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) at 50, 56, seem to mean that the "rights" asserted by the state were
political, not that the issue on the merits was beyond judicial competence. See D. CURRIE, supra
note 20, at 302-04.
329. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 485-86. For the state's authority in interstate suits, the Court
correctly cited Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (suit to abate water pollution), which
was reaffirmed immediately after Frothinghamin Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592
(1923) (Van Devanter, J.) (alternative holding). Even in this context, however, the Court tended to
be somewhat chary, lest limitations on its original jurisdiction be circumvented. See, e.g., New
Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 81 (1883), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 420
n.122, reaff'd in North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372-76 (1923) (Taft, C.J.) (allowing

state on behalf of its citizens to seek injunction but not damages).
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straightforward: If the contested payments were made, "this plaintiff...
will be subjected to taxation to pay her proportionate share of such unauthorized payments. ' 330 Sutherland's reply, already quoted, seemed to

make three points: The interest of a federal taxpayer was "shared by
millions of others"; it was "minute and indeterminable"; and the effect of
'33 1
payment on future taxation was "remote, fluctuating and uncertain.

In all these respects, said Sutherland, Frothingham differed from municipal taxpayers, who had been held to have standing to challenge
332
expenditures.
All of this has been severely criticized. Although Brandeis had

noted in Fairchildthat the right asserted by the plaintiff was one "possessed by every citizen,

' 333

he had not said why that mattered. Contrary

to Sutherland's suggestion that a flood of lawsuits in such circumstances
would be undesirable, 334 one might think it all the more important that

the government not get away with violating everybody's rights: One
would not expect to find standing to challenge an unreasonable search

denied on the ground that the government had unreasonably searched
everyone in the country. 335 Sutherland offered no evidence to support his
suggestion that the federal tax burden was smaller even in 1923 than the

municipal one, and trespass cases were but one indication that the law
had long permitted suit by persons suffering trivial harm. 336 More seri-

ous was the apparent suggestion that it was not clear whether enjoining
the contested payments would reduce the plaintiff's taxes: Congress

might have collected the money anyway and put it to some constitutional
use. Of course, this does not distinguish the municipal taxpayer, who the
Court conceded had standing. Nor is it clear why the mere possibility
330. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 477.
331. Id. at 487 (quoted supra text accompanying note 318).
332. Id. at 486-87 (citing Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601, 609 (1879)). In Williams v.
Riley, 280 U.S. 78, 80 (1929) (McReynolds, J.), a divided Court applied the Frothinghamprinciple,
without discussion, to preclude a taxpayer from challenging a state law. More surprisingly, it did so
in a case in which the taxpayer appeared to challenge not an expenditure, but the collection of the
tax itself. Id. at 79. However doubtful it may be that enjoining an expenditure will reduce the
plaintiff's tax bill, there seems no doubt that enjoining collection of the tax will reduce the amount
the plaintiff pays. The Court had entertained numerous suits to enjoin tax collection in the past and
would continue to do so. E.g., Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931); Allen v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 114 U.S. 311 (1884).
333. See Fairchild, 258 U.S. at 129.
334. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.
335. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973) ("To deny standing to persons who
are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious
and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion."). The widespread nature of the harm would provide a political check not present when a
narrow class or individual is alone damaged; but that would not defeat standing in the search case
posed in the text.
336. See id. at 685-90 (giving other examples).
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that the plaintiff may not benefit from a decision that reduces the government's need for tax money should be held to destroy the adverse interest
needed for sound decisionmaking- especially since the consequence
seems to have been that no one could challenge most federal
expenditures.
In short, Justice Sutherland seems right that an interested plaintiff
was an element of the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement,
but he did not satisfactorily explain why a federal taxpayer did not meet
that description.
b. Finalityand legislativefunctions Apart from its arguably misplaced concern for a lack of proper parties, the Court in Muskrat had
expressed concern about the nature of the remedy provided by the challenged jurisdictional provisions: A mere declaration of rights would not
bind private parties. 337 On the facts of the case, this argument also seems
to have been misplaced: There was no evident reason to doubt that the
lower court's decision would be entitled to normal res judicata effect. In
Postum Cereal Co. v. CaliforniaFigNut Co.,338 however, the Court found
an instance in which Muskrat's concern was apt. The Commissioner of
Patents had rejected a request to cancel the registration of a trademark,
and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had refused review. Chief
Justice Taft concluded that because the statute provided that a decision
in such a proceeding would not "preclude any person interested from the
right to contest the validity" of the trademark, the Supreme Court had
no jurisdiction over the appeal: "The decision of the Court of Appeals
...is not a judicial judgment.... In the exercise of such [administrative]
function it does not enter a judgment binding parties in a case as the term
case is used in the third article of the Constitution." 339
With this decision it is hard to quarrel; a judicial pronouncement
that would not bind the parties would literally be an advisory opinion.
The difficulty was that in Tutun v. United States, decided just the previous year, the Court had held explicitly that the ability of the government
to file a later suit to cancel naturalization did not destroy the justiciability
of a naturalization proceeding. 34° Perhaps the decisions are reconcilable
on the ground that the denaturalization provision went no further than
337. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911).
338. 272 U.S. 693 (1927) (Taft, C.J.).
339. Id. at 698-99. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 62 (1929), repealed by Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No.
593, § 5, 66 Stat. 792, 815.
340. Tutun, 270 U.S. at 579-80. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 146, at 95-97
(comparing the two decisions).
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traditional provisions for relief from illegal judgments, 341 but Taft did

not seek to distinguish Tutun.
Four years before Postum, in Keller v. Potomac Electric Power

Co., 342 the Court had refused to review a decision of the District of Co-

lumbia appellate court setting aside an administrative order determining
the value of utility property for rate purposes. Despite the superficial
similarity of the two cases, however, it was not the advisory character of
nonbinding decisions that dictated the result in Keller. Indeed the stat-

ute appeared to make the local court's decision immune from collateral
review. 34 3 Chief Justice Taft called upon a still more fundamental di-

mension of the case-or-controversy requirement: An article III court
may decide only judicial cases or controversies. The statute in question,
Taft concluded, went beyond conferring on the courts the ordinary
power to determine the legality of administrative action; in authorizing

the court to "revise the legislative discretion of the Commission by...
entering the order it deems the Commission ought to have made," Congress had attempted to confer the "legislative" power of "laying down

new rules, to change present conditions and to guide future action," not
the judicial power of "definition and protection of existing rights."'344 As
the case itself illustrated, drawing the line between judicial and legislative
functions was not going to be easy; 345 but the principle that the courts
could do only judicial business was certainly sound.
341. See Tutun, 270 U.S. at 579 ("The remedy afforded the Government by [the cancellation
provision] is narrower in scope than the review commonly afforded by appellate courts.").
342. 261 U.S. 428 (1923) (Taft, C.J.).
343. See Keller, 261 U.S. at 439-40 ("Paragraph 65 limits the time within which such a proceeding. .. may be begun to 120 days, and thereafter the right to appeal or of recourse to the courts
shall terminate absolutely.").
344. Id. at 440, 442 (citing Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908)). In
Prentis, the Court had drawn a similar distinction for the different purpose of determining whether a
federal challenge to a state rate order pending state court review was barred either by the ban on
enjoining state court proceedings or by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As to
exhaustion of remedies, the dominant consideration should be whether the state court's decision
would be preclusive, for if the court's decision is entitled to res judicata effect, a doctrine designed
only to postpone federal litigation will preclude it altogether. See Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 U.S.
134, 137 (1914); D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 662-63 (3d ed. 1982)
(citing H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 101 (1973)).
345. Although, in Keller, the Court held that article III forbade substitution of a court's judgment for that of an administrative agency, see supra notes 342-43 and accompanying text, in Ohio
Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 291 (1920), discussed in White, supranote 20,
at 1138 n.140, and in Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1922), the Court had held that
due process requiredit. Thus it can hardly have been de novo review, as such, that made the court's
function in Keller legislative rather than judicial, but rather the nature of the issue the court was to
consider. In Ng FungHo, the question was whether to deport a person claiming to be a citizen, Ng
FungHo, 259 U.S. at 282; in Ben Avon it was whether to set aside a utility rate as confiscatory, Ben
A von, 253 U.S. at 287-88. In both, in Keller's terms, the courts had been asked merely to determine
existing rights, not to lay down a new rule to govern future controversies.
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c. Declaratoryjudgments. In connection with its conclusion that
the judgment Congress had sought to authorize would not bind the parties, the Court in Muskrat had added that "in a legal sense" such a judgment "could not be executed. ' 346 Against the background of Chief
Justice Taney's dictum in Gordon v. United States that "[t]he award of
execution is... an essential part of every judgment passed by a court
exercising judicial power, ' 34 7 this language could be read to suggest that
no action seeking only a declaration of the rights of the litigants could be
a case or controversy because such a judgment would not order anyone
to do or refrain from doing anything. Two decisions of the Taft period
seemed to lend additional force to this position.
The first was Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis,348 in which the
Court unanimously affirmed a federal trial court's refusal to entertain a
suit seeking a declaration that a state statute regulating the plaintiffs'
tobacco business was unconstitutional. Without saying exactly why, Justice Sanford concluded that the case was governed by Muskrat. In listing
the elements of an article III case or controversy, he noted that there had
to be "real parties," a "real case," and the possibility of "pronouncing
and carrying into effect a judgment," and in summing up the facts he
observed that "no relief of any kind is prayed" against the state officer
who had been sued.34 9 The second case was Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association.350 There, in holding that article III precluded a federal
court from removing an alleged "cloud" on a lessee's right to replace a
building, Justice Brandeis stated flatly that what the plaintiff sought was
"simply a declaratory judgment" and that to "grant that relief is beyond
35
the power conferred upon the federal judiciary." '
Concurring in the result in Willing on the ground that the suit was
not "within the equity jurisdiction conferred" by statute, Justice Stone
politely tweaked Brandeis for deciding more than was necessary: "There
is certainly no 'case or controversy' before us requiring an opinion on the
power of Congress to incorporate the declaratory remedy into our federal
346. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 362; see also id at 361 ("The object is not to assert a property right as
against the Government, or to demand compensation for alleged wrongs ....
").
347. 117 U.S. 697, 702 (draft opinion). The case had been decided without opinion, 69 U.S. (2
Wall.) 561 (1867), after Taney's death, and there is no evidence that the Court had approved his
reasoning. Nor was the passage referred to necessary to the result; even Taney based his conclusion
on the statutory provision for executive review of the court's decision. Gordon, 117 U.S. at 702-03.
348. 273 U.S. 70 (1927).

349. Id at 73-74.
350. 277 U.S. 274 (1928).
351. Willing, 277 U.S. at 289 (citing Grannis, 273 U.S. at 74). Brandeis may have meant only
that no statute authorized such relief. See Borchard, The Constitutionalityof DeclaratoryJudgments, 31 COLUM. L. Rav. 561, 600 (1931).
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Indeed, apart from Stone's statutory argument, Bran-

deis's own opinion reveals a narrower ground for his holding: "No de-

fendant has wronged the plaintiff or has threatened to do so."' 353 The
same was true in Grannis, where Justice Sanford had emphasized the

absence of any allegation "that the plaintiffs have done or contemplate
doing any of the things forbidden by the Act before being advised by the
court as to their rights, [or] ... that the [defendant] has threatened to
take or contemplates taking any action against them. '3 54 Under these
circumstances, there might well have been in Sanford's terms no "real

case" and no "real parties" in either Grannisor Willing, even if coercive
relief had been sought; neither case need be taken to establish that a de-

claratory judgment is unavailable in an actual dispute between adverse
parties.

355

Just the year before Willing, in fact, Justice Stone had written an
opinion for the Court that appeared to conclude, in no uncertain terms,
that in such circumstances declaratory relief would be entirely consistent

with article 111.356 The question was whether a state court decision in a
suit by a city to determine the validity of a tax assessment was entitled to

res judicata effect; and that depended, according to Stone, on whether the

35 7
state proceeding had satisfied the case-or-controversy requirement.
352. Willing, 277 U.S. at 290-91. The Conformity Act, which required federal courts to follow
state procedural rules and might have been thought to embrace state-created remedies, applied only
to actions at law, and Willing was a suit in equity. In equity cases, Congress had, by negative
implication, prescribed adherence to federal equity practice. Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5,
17 Stat. 196 (1873). See also Grannis, 273 U.S. at 76 (rejecting the argument that Conformity Act
justified federal use of Kentucky declaratory judgment statute: former act "relates only to 'practice,
pleadings, and forms and modes of procedure'; and neither purports to nor can extend the jurisdiction of the district courts beyond the constitutional limitations").
353. Willing, 277 U.S. at 290. See also id. at 288 (explaining that the lessors, although made
defendants, had not taken a firm position denying the right the plaintiff claimed).
354. Grannis, 273 U.S. at 73. Professor Borchard was sharply critical of this reasoning. See
Borchard, supra note 351, at 585-89. He noted that the defendant had gone so far as to prepare an
indictment against the plaintiff, citing the Euclidand Pierce cases, see supra text accompanying notes
79, 91, in which the Court had enjoined the enforcement of statutes, as evidence that the Court had
not generally required a threat of enforcement, and he persuasively argued that "no civilized legal
system operating under a constitution" should in effect inform "the prospective victim that the only
way to determine whether the suspect is a mushroom or a toadstool is to eat it."
355. Keenly sensitive to the dangers of deciding premature constitutional issues, Justice Brandeis
several times dissented from constitutional decisions of this period on the ground that there was an
insufficient threat of harm to justify judicial intervention under article III even when traditional
coercive relief was requested. See supra note 313. Holmes, however, appeared to think that the
invalidity of the declaratory procedure had been settled by Grannis and that Willing reaffirmed it:
"'I do not care to join in the criticism of his [Brandeis's] opinion,' he wrote on his copy of Stone's
concurrence [in Willing], 'but I also regret his conclusion that we cannot render declaratory judgments-which, however, I thought had been stated heretofore.'" A. MASON, STONE, supra note 2,
at 246.
356. See Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123 (1927).
357. IJd at 130-31.
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The Court held that it had, although it had resulted only in a declaration
that the taxpayers were liable: "While ordinarily a case or controversy
results in a judgment requiring award of process of execution to carry it
into effect, such relief is not an indispensable adjunct to the exercise of
the judicial function." 35 Commendably cited for this conclusion were
"suits... for the construction of a will,.... bills to quiet title," and Tutun
v. United States, written by Brandeis himself, which had upheld judicial
power to issue a certificate of naturalization. 35 9 The year after Willing,
this language was repeated approvingly in an opinion for the Court by
360
Chief Justice Taft.
In short, as the result of decisions during the Taft period, the contours of the case-or-controversy limitation seemed to be shaping up
pretty clearly. Aside from the embarrassing problem of naturalization,
there had to be interested parties on both sides; there had to be actual
harm or threat of harm; the determination must be of a judicial rather
than legislative nature and must be binding on the parties. Despite unnecessarily broad statements in Muskrat, Grannis,and Willing, the stage
seemed to be set for the Court to entertain requests for declaratory judgments that would finally settle a ripe and concrete dispute between adverse parties.
2. Judicial Independence. In the Keller and Postum cases, the
Supreme Court had held it could not review the decision of a District of
Columbia court in a nonjudicial proceeding. At the same time, however,
it had confirmed the authority of the local courts over the same proceedings. Not all limitations that restricted congressional power to legislate
within the states, Taft explained, were applicable to the District. There,
by virtue of article I's grant of authority "(t]o exercise exclusive legisla358. Id. at 132.
359. Id. Also on point were bills to remove existing clouds from titles, which Brandeis had
seemed to concede in Willing were traditionally cognizable by the courts. Willing, 277 U.S. at 288.
Unlike Stone's other examples, the naturalization proceeding resulted not simply in a declaration of
existing rights, but in a change of status. See Borchard, The DeclaratoryJudgment-A Needed
ProceduralReform, 28 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1918) (arguing for broader remedy). It was, however,
convincing evidence that the existence of a case or controversy did not depend upon the availability
of coercive relief.
360. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 725 (1929) (alternative holding)
(upholding judicial authority to review decision of Board of Tax Appeals approving deficiency assessment). "[Lit is not necessary, in order to constitute a judicial judgment that there should be...
power to issue formal execution to carry the judgment into effect ...
" Id. Though this statement
was qualified by the argument that "[a] judgment is sometimes regarded as properly enforceable
through the executive departments instead of through an award of execution by the Court, where the
effect of the judgment is to establish the duty of the department to enforce it," the Court went on to
cite Swope for the more general proposition that "the award of execution is not an indispensable
element." Id.
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tion in all cases whatsoever," Congress had all the powers of a state legislature: "Subject to the guaranties of personal liberty in the amendments
and in the original Constitution, Congress has as much power to vest
courts of the District with a variety of jurisdiction and powers as a state
' 361
legislature has in conferring jurisdiction on its courts."
It was obvious enough from the text that article I was meant to give
Congress the power to regulate matters of local concern in the District;
federalism concerns have no place in territory over which Congress has
exclusive jurisdiction. It did not necessarily follow, however, that the
District of Columbia provision also did away with limitations, such as
the case-or-controversy requirement, that reflected the distinct philosophy of separation of powers. Taft conceded that Congress's power over
the District was limited by constitutional "guaranties of personal liberty"; he needed to explain why it was not limited by article III's case-orcontroversy requirement as well.
His sole effort to do so was the suggestion in Postum that courts of
the District were not courts "established under Article 111."362 The implication seemed to be that, under its power to legislate for the District of
Columbia, Congress could establish courts that met none of the requirements of article III: neither the limitation to disputes of national significance listed in section 2, nor the case-or-controversy limitation, nor the
requirements of tenure and irreducible compensation in section 1.363
Like the case-or-controversy limitation, the tenure and salary provisions serve the separation of powers: They assure the litigant the protection of an independent judge. 364 There was no reason as an original
matter to think judicial independence less important in the District than
elsewhere. The Court had held in Marshall's time, however, that courts
could be created in the territories without reference to the requirements
for establishing courts within the states. 365 If this was true of the territories, it might also be true of the District, which was in a similarly anomalous position; although the transitoriness of the territories meant that
361. Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43 (1923); accord Postum Cereal Co.

v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693, 700 (1927).
362. Postum, 272 U.S. at 700.
363. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
364. See eg., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529 (A. Hamilton) (Q. Cooke ed. 1961) ("That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the constitution and of individuals, which we perceive to
be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their
offices by a temporary commission."); THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 531 (A. Hamilton) (Q. Cooke ed.
1961) ("And we can never hope to see realised in practice the complete separation of the judicial
from the legislative power, in any system, which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources
on the occasional grants of the latter.").
365. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828), discussed in D. CURRIE,
supra note 20, at 119.
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application of the tenure requirement there would have created a problem of surplus judges inapplicable to the District, that had not been Mar366
shall's reason for decision.
None of this was said in Keller or in Postum. Justice Van Devanter
said it, however, in Ex parte Bakelite Corp.367 in 1929, upholding the
authority of the Court of Customs Appeals to render what appeared to
be an advisory opinion. Keller, Postum, and the territorial cases, he announced, had "settled that Article III does not express the full authority
of Congress to create courts, and that other Articles invest Congress with
powers in the exertion of which it may create inferior courts and clothe
them with functions deemed essential or helpful in carrying those powers
into execution. ' 368 Because the Court of Customs Appeals had not been
created pursuant to article III, it was not subject to article III's limitations. It was thus unnecessary to decide whether the business at hand
constituted a case or controversy. And in unmistakable dictum, the
Court added that the judges of the Court of Customs Appeals held office
3 69
only "for such term as Congress prescribes."
In so concluding, the Court took a giant step beyond the precedents.
Both the territorial and District of Columbia cases had expressly relied
on the special status of those areas. It was one thing to hold article III
inapplicable to areas outside the states. It was quite another to hold article III could be evaded within the states themselves. Marshall had flatly
said in the first territorial case that the latter could not be done:
Although the territories were subject to a different rule, "admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the states in those Courts, only, which are
established in pursuance of the third article of the Constitution. '370 This
dictum had been resoundingly confirmed when the Court overturned the
court-martial conviction of a civilian in Ex parte Miligan: "One of the
plainest constitutional provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan
was tried by a court not ordained and established by Congress, and not
'371
composed of judges appointed during good behavior.
366. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 535-38 (1933) (distinguishing the District

on this ground). But see Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 405-07 (1973) (taking it back).
367. 279 U.S. 438 (1929). The statute in question empowered the President to impose sanctions
on importers whom he found guilty of unfair practices. The Court of Customs Appeals was authorized to review administrative determinations that were merely recommendations to the President.
Id. at 446-47. Cf D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 6 (discussing Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409

(1792)).
368. Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 449.

369. Id. at 449-50, 460-61.
370. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
371. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 122 (1867) (alternative holding). See D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 288.
Milligan conceded that article III did not forbid the court-martial of military personnel for service-

connected crimes, as had been acknowledged in Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1858)
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Apparently alert to the danger that the Bakelite decision posed to

article III's goal of an independent judiciary, Justice Van Devanter took
steps to limit the extent of the damage: "Legislative" courts not enjoying
article III protections could be created not in all cases but only-apart
from special geographical areas-"to examine and determine various

matters, arising between the government and others, which from their
nature do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of
it.'' 372 This formulation was taken from the 1856 decision in Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 373 which had held that arti-

cle III did not forbid the government to collect its debts by seizing the
debtor's property. Customs duties, Van Devanter concluded, could be
collected in the same way; and thus the collection of customs could be
entrusted to a court whose judges lacked the tenure guaranteed by article
11I.374

The non sequiturwas glaring. Murray'sLessee held only that article
III did not require that courts always be used. When courts are used,

however, article III leaves no doubt about the tenure or salary of their
judges.
B.

375

The Executive and Congress.

1. Myers v. United States. In 1789, Congress had carefully
amended a bill establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs to pro(dictum). But the fact that article III was held not to have displaced the traditiorl of extraordinary
military trials would hardly have been an excuse for holding that article III imposed no limitation at
all. See Currie,BankruptcyJudges and the Independent Judiciary,16 CREIGHToN L. REV. 441,449
(1983).
372. Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 451.
373. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856) ("[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which
may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are
susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper."). See D. CURRIE, supra note 20, at
272.
374. Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 458. That due process really permitted taxes to be collected without
even a subsequent opportunity for hearing on the question whether they were due seems doubtful in
light of Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 24 (1920): "To say that the county could collect these
unlawful taxes by coercive means and not incur any obligation to pay them back is nothing short of
saying that it could take or appropriate the property of these Indian allottees arbitrarily and without
due process of law." For a valiant effort to explore the limits of the principle that matters not
"inherently" judicial could be entrusted to legislative tribunals, see Katz, FederalLegislativeCourts,
43 HARV. L. RIV. 894 (1930). See also Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 452-55 (concluding that Court of
Claims was legislative court because government debts had long been paid by legislative or executive
action and because government's creditors had no "right to sue. . . unless Congress consents").
375. Moreover, as the second Justice Harlan pointed out many years later, the fact that Congress
might have had power to create a legislative court did not prove it had done so. Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 549-51 (1962) (plurality opinion). The premise of'Murray'sLessee, on which
the Bakelite Court relied, had been that Congress had a choice whether or not to entrust to a court
government matters not inherently judicial.
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vide, not that the Secretary would be "removable by the President," but
that his subordinate would assume certain functions "whenever the said
principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the
United States"-in order, the sponsor of the amendment said, to avoid
any implication that the power of removal was for Congress to give or
withhold. 376 In 1867, President Johnson was impeached, but not convicted, for discharging the Secretary of War in violation of an 1867 statute effectively requiring Senate consent for his removal.3 77 In 1926, in
Myers v. United States,378 a divided Court held that Congress could not
constitutionally require Senate consent for the discharge of a postmaster
who had been appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate.
Myers was a battle royal. In sharp contrast with most constitutional
decisions of the period, the various opinions cover nearly two hundred
pages. The depth of historical research on both sides was impressive.
Relying heavily on the 1789 incident and dismissing the 1867 statute as
an aberration reflecting the excesses of the Reconstruction Congress in a
time of crisis, ex-President Taft produced his most prodigious opinion in
a case that was obviously close to his heart. The power to remove executive officers, he argued, was an element of the "executive Power" conferred on the President by article II and "an incident of the power to
appoint them," which the same article conferred. Moreover, article II
also directed the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." This he could do only "by the assistance of subordinates"; and it
would be unreasonable to conclude that Congress could "fasten[ ] upon
him, as subordinate executive officers, men who by their inefficient service under him, by their lack of loyalty to the service, or by their different
view of policy, might make his taking care that the laws be faithfully
3 79
executed most difficult or impossible."
In separate dissents, McReynolds and Brandeis offered an alternative view of history and an alternative interpretation of the constitutional
provisions. Removal itself might be an executive act, but determining
the conditions for removal was a legislative function committed to Congress under the necessary and proper clause. The executive power vested
in the President was only that which was expressly enumerated. The
Reconstruction Congress was not alone in enacting restrictions on removal; the Court had upheld one in United States v. Perkins in 1886.
376. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 111-15 (1926) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 37071, 383, 455, 576, 578-80, 585, 591 (1789); Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 28, 29.
377. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 166; Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (providing that
officers appointed with Senate consent hold office until approval of their successors).
378. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
379. Id. at 117, 131, 161, 175-76. For Justice Stone's substantial role in the reworking of Taft's
opinion, see A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 2, at 225-32.
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The 1789 incident was ambiguous, and nobody doubted that Congress
could inhibit Presidential control of his subordinates by rejecting his
38 0
nominees or by prescribing qualifications for office.
As a purely textual matter, a variety of conclusions would have been
plausible. At one extreme, the provision for removal upon impeachment
for high crimes and misdemeanors 381 might have been taken to imply
that otherwise officers were not removable at all. Alternatively, Taft's
argument that the power of removal implicitly went along with that of
appointment might have led to the conclusion that Senate approval was
always required to remove officers whose appointments were subject to
Senate consent-whether Congress wanted it that way or not.38 2 Finally,
there were the contrasting positions embraced by the various Justices:
that the manner of removal had been left to Congress by the necessary
and proper clause, and that Congress's power was limited by the grants
of executive authority in article 11.383
Taken together, the opinions suggest that history, while rich in relevant materials, yields no clear understanding of the correct interpretation. 38 4 If that is so, the central question boils down to whether-judicial

precedents for the moment to one side-one interpretation or another is
more consistent with the general purposes of the framers. On that issue
the Chief Justice seems to have had a strong argument: Presidents cannot effectively carry out their constitutional obligation to see that the
laws are faithfully executed if they cannot control their subordinates, and
they cannot control them without authority to remove. Senate power to
block appointments, specifically provided in article II, seems to represent
the extent to which the framers were willing to compromise the President's authority, and it does not require the President to work with those
who would contradict his orders. 385 Finally, as the Chief Justice argued,
380. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 178-295. Holmes added a brief dissent, id. at 177, essentially on the
ground that it was up to Congress to decide whether or not to create the office of postmaster.
381. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
382. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 77, at 515 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("The consent of
that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint."). Taft rejected this conclusion on
the ground that the consent requirement had been based upon the need to assure small states a voice
on the staffing of offices, not on "any desire to limit removals." Myers, 272 U.S. at 119-20, 164.
383. Compare the similarly knotty question whether the President alone may terminate a treaty
made with Senate consent under article II, section 2. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)
(where majority found suit attempting to raise question nonjusticiable).
384. See Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Powerunder the Constitution, 27 COLUM. L.
REv. 353 (1927) (painstakingly attacking Taft's view of history).
385. The latter consideration also serves to distinguish the power of Congress to prescribe qualifications for office, so stressed by Brandeis in dissent. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 264-74. For the
position that Taft's argument for presidential control was of less force with respect to officials below
the Cabinet level, see Corwin, supra note 384, at 394-95; Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in
DeterminingIncidental Powers of the Presidentand of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horl-
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the creation of a unified executive had been one of the prime purposes of
38 6
the Constitution.

Precedent, invoked by the dissenters, was not really to the contrary,
though Taft did not distinguish it as successfully as he might have. Mar-

bury v. Madison, in what Taft with technical accuracy characterized as
dictum, had stated without qualification that the President could not in
effect dismiss a justice of the peace appointed for a term of years; 38 7 but
control of judicial officers, even where not prohibited by article 111,3 8 8 is
hardly necessary to the unified exercise of executive power. More nearly
in point was United States v. Perkins,389 which had upheld Congress's
power to place limitations on the removal of inferior officers appointed

by heads of departments. As Taft noted, the Court in reaching this decision had said that the power to provide for such appointments implied
the power of limiting removal, 390 but this conclusion seems inconsistent
39 1
with the Court's argument for executive control in Myers.
More to the point was the Chief Justice's further observation that

Perkins had not held that Congress could "draw to itself, or to either
branch of it, the power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that power.1 39 2 The statute in Perkins had not required Senate
consent; it had provided for a court martial. Presumably disobedience of
zontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 102, 114-15. Cf.
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (dictum) (first amendment does not forbid discharge of
certain key officers for political reasons); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 366-67 (1976) (dictum)
(discharges of policymaking government employees for lack of affiliation with party in power do not
violate first amendment). As the later cases suggest, absolute presidential discretion in firing seems
less critical at less discretionary levels, but the power to discharge those who disobey orders seems
indispensable throughout government.
386. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 116-17 (citing the Constitutional Convention debates and alluding
to "the humiliating weakness of the Congress during the Revolution and under the Articles of Confederations"); I M. FARRAND, supra note 282, at 64-97; THE FEDERALIsr, No. 70, at 472 (A.
Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 599-602 (1984). None of the analogies invoked by
Professor Corwin, supra note 384, at 384, would divide responsibility for executive functions: "No
one would contend that the President could appropriate money, or erect courts, or create offices, or
enlarge the military forces, on the justification that such action was necessary to assure the enforcement of the laws."
387. 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137, 162 (1803) "[Als the law creating the office, gave the officer a right
to hold for five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable ... "). See
Myers, 272 U.S. at 139-43.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 367-75 (discussing Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S.
438 (1929)).
389. 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886).
390. See id. at 485, noted in Myers, 272 U.S. at 161.
391. See Corwin, supranote 384, at 357-58 ("[T]he decision in the Myers case, considered in the
light of the reasoning supporting it, endows the President with a power of removal over all executive
officers of the United States however appointed, which power Congress cannot control .
392. Myers, 272 U.S. at 161.
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Presidential orders would be a ground for court martial; like the Civil
Service laws so loudly invoked by the dissent in Myers,393 the Perkins law
left the President with ample authority to enforce his policies through
394
discharge of obstructive subordinates.

2. Other Cases. In Myers v. United States, thanks in part to the
influence of ex-President Taft, the Court came down firmly on the side of
executive over legislative power. Similarly, the Court made maximum
use of an unusual constellation of other cases to establish additional executive prerogatives during the Taft years.
J W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States 395 was a relatively easy
decision. There, relying on precedent, the Chief Justice wrote to hold
that a law authorizing the President to increase tariffs to make up for
lower foreign production costs did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power, because it merely called upon the President to execute "an
intelligible principle" laid down by Congress. 396 More novel was the

conclusion in Springerv. PhilippineIslands397 that provisions of the Philippine Organic Act vesting legislative power in the legislature and executive power in the Governor General forbade legislative participation in
selecting the directors of public corporations. 398 Relying in part on Myers, Justice Sutherland concluded that the appointment of nonlegislative
officers was an executive rather than a legislative function, and therefore
it could not be entrusted to members of the legislature. 399
Since the provisions on which the Court relied had counterparts in
the Constitution, there was reason to think the same fate would have
befallen a similar act of Congress. Indeed, the case for a similar conclusion is far stronger in the case of the federal government. Article II specifically provides for the appointment of most officers by the President
(with or without Senate consent), by the heads of departments, or by the
courts. 4 0 As for the Philippines, not only did Holmes and Brandeis protest rather abstractly that separation of powers was not an absolute con393. Id. at 262-64 (Brandeis, J.,dissenting).

394. See Strauss, supra note 386, at 607-08.
395. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
396. Id. at 409-11 (1928) (citing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (upholding grant of author-

ity to retaliate for "unreasonable" foreign tariffs)). See FullerI, supra note 20, at 339-43. Unlike
Myers, this case did not present a conflict between the President and Congress, for Congress had
sought to grant the President the authority he sought to exercise.
397. 277 U.S. 189 (1928).

398. Id. at 204-06.
399. Id. at 205.
400. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109-43 (1976) (holding the Houses of Congress not "De-

partments" for this purpose).
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cept, 4° 1 there were enough states in which legislatures had been given
appointment powers to make questionable the Court's easy conclusion
that the appointment of officers was not a legislative task. 4°2
More interesting still was the Pocket Veto Case, decided in 1929. 403
Nine days after presenting a bill to the President for his signature, the
sixty-ninth Congress adjourned its first session sine die.404 The President
had taken no action on the bill, and the question was whether it had
become a law.
To Justice Sanford, writing for a unanimous Court, the question was
answered by the text of article I. Section 7 of that article provides that a
bill shall become law if it "shall not be returned by the President within
ten Days" "to that House in which it shall have originated," "unless the
Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall
not be a Law." "[T]en days," said the Court, meant calendar (not legislative) days excluding Sundays, the "House" meant the body in session
and not its clerk, and "Adjournment" was not limited to the final dispersal before the convening of a new Congress. 40 5 Thus, because Congress's
adjournment had prevented the President from returning the bill to the
House within ten days, it had not become a law.
Apart from reliance on impressive evidence of longstanding legislative and executive understanding, 406 the Court's reasoning was largely
textual: The explicit exclusion of Sundays from the ten-day period confirmed the presumption that the words of that provision were "to be
taken in their natural and obvious sense"; 4° 7 the "House" to which the
bill was to be returned was the same that was to "proceed to reconsider
it";408

section 5 of the same article provided that a number less than a

quorum could "adjourn from day to day" and that neither House should
"adjourn for more than three days" without the other's consent. 4°9
401. See Springer, 277 U.S. at 209-12 (Holmes, I.,
joined by Brandeis, I., dissenting).
402. See Corwin, supra note 384, at 387 & n.88 ("The power of appointment is not an inherent
executive power but a specific power. This has always been the controlling principle in the state
constitutions; and by accepted canons of construction it is likewise the view of the United States
Constitution."). In reaching the additional conclusion that appointment was an executive function,
the Court unnecessarily implied that it could not be entrusted to an independent agency either, but
in so holding, the Court had the backing of the policy of unified executive control that had also
underlain Myers.
403. 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
404. Id. at 672.
405. d at 679-83.
406. See id. at 683-91.

407. Id. at 679.
408. Id. at 681.
409. Id. at 680.
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Little consideration was given to the question whether such a literal
reading was compatible with the purposes of the provisions being construed. The basic principle of the section is to give the President not an
absolute veto but one subject to override by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses. 4 10 The requirement that the President return a bill within ten
days prevents him from converting a suspensive veto into an absolute one
by inaction. The exception for cases in which adjournment prevents
timely return of the bill keeps Congress from destroying the veto power
altogether by disbanding. To hold that every absence of Congress on the
tenth day is an "adjournment" that prevents return of a bill, however,
would allow a President to take advantage of every brief recess to cir4 11
cumvent the legislative right to override his veto.
This argument was noted, but rejected, in the Court's opinion. Sanford concluded that since the Constitution deliberately gave the President a full ten days in which to consider the merits of a bill, it was
improper to blame the death of a bill not returned before adjournment on
a presidential plot to avoid override: It was "attributable solely to the
action of Congress in adjourning before the time allowed the President
'4 12
for returning the bill had expired.
As the Court suggested, Congress can protect its right to override
presidential objections by remaining in session continuously for ten days
after passing each bill. The burden of its doing so, however, seems unnecessarily wasteful. As the losing party argued, the relative rights of
both the President and Congress could be equally served at lower cost by
holding that a return to the agent of an absent House sufficed to keep a
bill from immediately becoming law. Congress, if it chose, could then
repass the bill when it reconvened, and the basic principle of a suspensive
4 13
veto would be preserved.
Unfortunately, this argument seems to mean that the provision for
the death of a bill that cannot be returned was unnecessary, while the
410. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it

shall be sent, together with the Objections [of the President], to the other House, by which
it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall
become a Law.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl.2. For insistence that the veto should not be absolute, see I M. FARRAND, supra note 282, at 98-104 (Convention debate and vote rejecting absolute veto); THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 494-99 (A. Hamilton) (3. Cooke ed. 1961).

411. See Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 596-97 (1938) (Hughes, C.J.). That a simple
majority of Congress could pass a new bill to the same effect as the vetoed one seems not to disparage

this conclusion. After a pocket veto, the measure may have to be repassed not once but twice, since
it, being a new bill, is subject to another veto. Moreover, Congress's ability to pass the new measure
twice is dependent upon the absence of a second pocket veto.
412. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 676-79.
413. See id. at 679 n.6.
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framers clearly contemplated cases in which return would be impossible.
Perhaps they merely thought there might be times when not even a congressional clerk could be found, such as after final adjournment. Or per-

haps, as Sanford argued, they contemplated that a returned bill would
receive immediate reconsideration, rather than lingering "in a state of
'4 14
suspended animation.
The holding was only that the final adjournment of one session of
Congress "prevent[ed]" the subsequent return of bills. The Court's textual arguments, however, seemed equally applicable to brief adjournments in the course of a session. In that context, as suggested by

Sanford's own concern about "suspended animation," the Court's literal
approach would appear to enhance presidential power without serving
4 15
any legitimate countervailing purpose.
In McGrain v. Daugherty,4 1 6 where the executive power was not at
risk, the Taft Court gave a boost to legislative authority. 4 17 There the

Court resoundingly affirmed a broad implicit congressional power to investigate matters pertinent to possible legislation, 4 18 a power that had
been placed under a cloud by the hostility displayed in Kilbourn v.
Thompson some forty years before.419 Nevertheless, in conflicts between
414. Id. at 684-85.
415. Some of the implications of the opinion were repudiated in Wright v. United States, 302
U.S. 583 (1938), in which, over the protest of Justice Stone, the Court held that an adjournment of a
single House for not more than three days, as permitted by article I, section 5, was not an adjournment of "Congress" that would stop the running of the ten-day period for returning a bill under
section 7. In order to avoid the conclusion that such a recess deprived the President of his veto
power entirely, it was necessary to retract Justice Sanford's emphatic conclusion that a return to a
clerical employee could never constitute a return to the originating House, for otherwise the President would have no way of returning the bill even though Congress had not adjourned. Stone got
around this unacceptable result by construing the reference to an adjournment of "Congress" to
mean, in light of its purpose, that of the originating House. Id. at 605-09 (concurring opinion). The
trouble with that solution was, as suggested in the text, that it unnecessarily gave the President an
absolute veto during every brief recess. In holding that delivery to an authorized agent sufficed,
Hughes emphasized this problem, thereby raising doubts whether even an adjournment of both
Houses that was brief enough not to place a bill in "suspended animation" would be held to "prevent" return within the meaning of section 7. See id at 596-97; Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430,
437 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that no intrasession adjournment "prevented" return); see also Barnes
v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 35-38 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding the Pocket Veto Case no longer applicable to
"modem intersession adjournment" because of decreased length of absences and explicit provision
by House for acceptance of return by clerk).
416. 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (Van Devanter, J.).
417. See Barry v. United States ex reL Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929) (upholding Senate
power to investigate Senate elections and to compel the appearance of witnesses at hearings during
such investigations); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929) (Butler, J.) (upholding the Teapot
Dome investigation).
418. McGrain, 273 U.S. at 160-67.
419. 103 U.S. 168 (1881). Kilbourn had not denied the power to investigate for legislative purposes, but had appeared to take a dim view of congressional investigations generally and had found
no legitimate legislative purpose for the one in question. See D. CURRIE,supra note 20, at 437-38.
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executive and legislative power, the former invariably prevailed while exPresident Taft was at the helm.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Chief Justice Taft was a strong leader. 420 Like several of his predecessors, he wrote far more constitutional decisions than did any of his
colleagues. He kept for himself not only the Wagnerian separation-ofpowers struggle of Myers v. United States, but also the bulk of the great
issues of federalism in such cases as the ChildLabor Tax Case, Brooks v.
United States, Stafford v. Wallace, and Olsen v. Board of Trade. In these
matters he set the tone of the period: by no means grudging in interpretation of Congress's enumerated powers, but alert to prevent their misuse
to usurp authority not granted.
Though he wrote relatively little in the field of substantive due process, Taft set the tone here, too, by his strikingly aggressive opinion in
Truax v. Corrigan, and by his silent concurrences in most of the great
due process decisions of the time. It was in this area, however, that he
wrote his sole dissenting opinion in a constitutional case, protesting the
invalidation of the minimum wage law in Adkins v. Children'sHospital.
It was not simply that he, like Fuller, generally chose not to highlight his
disagreements by writing opinions. Rather, unless he routinely declined
even to acknowledge disagreement, he seems to have been in remarkable
accord with the decisions of his colleagues; for in nine terms he recorded
a dissenting vote in only a handful of constitutional cases. Taft truly
appeared to embody the spirit of the Court over which he presided. 42 1
Spokesmen for the Court in the pivotal due process and equal protection cases were Butler, McReynolds, and, above all, Sutherland, author of Adkins and of the three decisions striking down price regulation
For detailed advocacy of a broad investigative power, see Landis, ConstitutionalLimitationson the
CongressionalPower ofInvestigation, 40 HARv. L. REv. 153 (1926).
420. For an affirmative appraisal of Taft's performance as an administrator, see A. MASON,

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFr, supra note 2, at 299-301. For his efforts to influence judicial appointments, see id. at 162-91. For his leading role in obtaining relief from the oppressive docket, see id. at
108-14, and in obtaining authorization for the Court's own building, see id. at 133-37 (adding more

generally that "Taft's lobbying has no precedent in Supreme Court annals," id. at 137).
421. Taft was a forceful and often powerful opinion writer. See, eg., Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926), discussed supra text accompanying notes 55-73; Cooke v. United States, 267
U.S. 517 (1925) (hearing required to convict for contempt outside courtroom); Exparte Grossman,
267 U.S. 87 (1925) (President may pardon criminal contempt); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S.
444 (1924) (reaffirming inapplicability of contract clause to judicial action); Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 562-67 (1923) (dissenting opinion), discussedsupra text accompanying notes

67-73; Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 34-44 (1922), discussedsupra text accompanying notes
249-56; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 512-28 (1922), discussed supra text accompanying note
257; Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (reaffirming the inapplicability of criminal jury provi-

sions to unincorporated possessions).
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as well as of the limiting opinion upholding zoning in Village ofEuclid v.
Ambler Realty Co. Butler tended to be somewhat less tolerant of state
regulation than his colleagues, Sutherland less tolerant of federal regulation, and McReynolds less tolerant of either.422 Apart from his virtual
monopoly on maritime cases and his prodigious dissent in Myers v.
United States, McReynolds made his mark principally by a strident judicial activism. That activism led him not only to write the famous and
much-admired "liberal" decisions in favor of academic freedom in Meyer
v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, but also to dissent more frequently in constitutional cases than anyone but Holmes and Brandeis,
423
usually because the Court had upheld some state or federal regulation.
Van Devanter and Sanford, who wrote relatively little,424 almost

never wrote dissenting opinions. Both generally agreed with the majority, though Van Devanter seemed somewhat more, and Sanford somewhat less, willing than most to invalidate state legislation. 4 25 Van

Devanter wrote most significantly on such exotic questions as legislative
investigations and judicial independence, while Sanford is known principally for his narrow views of free speech in Gitlow and Whitney.4 26
422. Butler dissented in both Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926),
and Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), Sutherland in Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 597
(1926), and Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 43 (1923) (as well as, uncharacteristically, in
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 413 (1923)). McReynolds dissented inLambert,272 U.S. at 605,
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 528 (1922), Olsen, 262 U.S. at 43, and Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397.
Professor Paschal gives Sutherland much of the credit for the resurgence of laissez-faire constitutionalism in the 1920's and 1930's, see J. PASCHAL, supra note 2, at 153, adding that Sutherland
"stands apart from his conservative colleagues primarily because he was a man of ideas" who had a
well-developed theory of the proper functions of government, id. at 241.
423. Against this background it is interesting that McReynolds also tended to join his substantive adversary Brandeis in protesting what they considered premature judicial intervention. See
supra note 313 (discussing Pennsylvania v. West Virginia and Terrace v. Thompson). Apart from
Myers, McReynolds's opinions tended to be cursory. See A. BICKEL & B. SCIMIDT, supra note 24,
at 341-57 (describing the difficulties of working with McReynolds and adding that he gave little
attention to his opinions); A. MASON, WILLIAM HowARD TAFT, supra note 2, at 195 (quoting
Taft's remark that McReynolds was "always trying to escape work").
424. See A. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, supra note 2, at 195, 209 (describing Van Devanter as strong in conference but "opinion-shy" and "the sloviest member" at writing opinions); 2
H. PRINGLE, supra note 2, at 971 (quoting Letter from Taft to Horace Taft, Dec. 26, 1924) (Van
Devanter was "[In]y mainstay in the court").
425. Van Devanter dissented in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397
(1926); Sanford in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 567 (1923), and in the price-regulation case of Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 454 (1927).
426. Clarke, Day, Pitney, and McKenna left the Court without making noteworthy contributions to the constitutional jurisprudence of the Taft period. See A. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD
TAFr, supra note 2, at 161, 213-15 (noting Clarke's boredom, Day's advanced age, Pitney's nervous
breakdown, and McKenna's senility and the fact that, after his brethren had agreed not to decide
any case in which his vote was crucial, McKenna finally retired at Taft's urging).
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Fundamentally not in sympathy with the prevailing judicial philoso-

phy, Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone made their names during the Twenties
very largely in dissent. 427 For the Court, Holmes and Brandeis scored
liberal gains in the procedural area by writing against mob-dominated
trials and for de novo review of citizenship claims respectively. Holmes

struck an extreme blow for judicial restraint by upholding involuntary
sterilization in Buck v. Bell, and Brandeis exercised similar restraint in
his disparagement of declaratory relief in Willing v. ChicagoAuditorium
Association. Judicial restraint was the dominant theme of the numerous
dissents of all three Justices, especially in substantive due process and
equal protection cases. Yet it was Holmes who wrote for the Court to

strike down a regulation as a taking in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
and all three Justices were more interventionist than the majority in the

wiretapping case of Olmstead. Strikingly, Stone parted company from
Holmes and Brandeis in their most notable departure from judicial restraint by joining the majority in allowing limitations on speech in Gitlow
and Whitney.
When Taft and Sanford died in 1930, the Court was left with four
aggressive advocates of substantive due process and three articulate apos-

tles of judicial restraint. As the Depression deepened, it was evident that
President Hoover's choices to fill the two vacancies would be of the utmost importance.

427. Just as before Taft's appointment, Brandeis's dissents tended to be learned treatises on the
history and background of the provisions in question-designed, like his earlier briefs, to demonstrate, as they so often did, the reasonableness of the laws. For examples, see his dissents in Frost v.
Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929) (cooperatives), discussed supra text accompanying note
32; Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (bread-weight provisions), discussedsupra
text accompanying note 75; Missouri ex reL Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262
U.S. 276 (1923) (rate regulation); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (labor legislation), discussed supra text accompanying notes 25-30; Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution,
45 HARv. L. REV. 33, 60 (1931). For additional displays of Brandeis's awesome wizardry in dealing
with complex financial matters, see his majority opinions in Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649 (1923) (banking); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413
(1923) (income taxation). Holmes, as usual, tended to be pithy. For an illuminating contrast of the
styles of these two allies, see A. MASON, BRANDEIS, supra note 2, at 570-81 (concluding that
"Holmes is the enlightened skeptic; Brandeis, the militant crusader").

